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for his guidance and technical assistance. The original idea was 
much more ambitious, since it included an analysis of Eurwmius' 
response to St Basil's Anatreptikos and the further responses to 
Eurwmius provided by St Basil's brother, St Gregory of Nyssa, 
and other patristic authors. Having done this wider research and 
analysis it became clear that a much larger dissertation was 
required which went beyond the confines of the Master's thesis. 
Since circumstances did not permit me to embark on such a task 
I had to restrict myself to St Basil alone. What there[ ore is 
presented here is a basis for any further research into the wider 
topic of the Eurwmian Cappadocian debate on God. It has a 
small claim of originality in that it presents for the first time a 
comprehensive analysis of a work which has not yet appeared in 
English translation and which is Basil's first dogmatic theological 
treatise. 
I also want to express my gratitude here for the assistance, 
financial and moral, which I was given by His Beatitude 
Archbishop Chrysostomos of Cyprus, by the Rt Reverend Bishop 
Barnabas of Salamis and by the Very Rev. Hegoumen Nicephoros 
of the Holy Monastery of Panagia of Kykkos. 
Most of all I want to thank my wife Stella who releaved me 
from family duties and made it possible to me to travel to 
Durham on several occasions and complete my project. 
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PART 1: 
INTRODUCTION 
(1) St Basil the Great: A brief biographical memorandum 
St Basil the Great's own writings and especially his Epistles 
are the most important sources for his life and work.(1) Equally 
important, however, is the Funeral Oration of St Gregory the 
Theologian (Nazianzen), which was delivered in AD 381 for his 
friend Basil, because, in effect, it constitutes a biography of 
Basil. There are also several important points of biographical 
information in the rest of the works of the Theologian and 
especially in his Poems and Epistles.(2) Further notable sources 
for the life and career of Basil are: the Encomiastic Oration on 
his brother(3) and the "Life" of his Sister Macrina(4) of St 
Gregory of Nyssa, the pseudepigraphic Life of St Basil(5) and 
the possibly pseudepigraphic Oration on Basi1(6) of Amphilo-
chius of !conium, and the information in the Ecclesiastical 
Histories of Socrates (4:26) and of Sozomenus (6:15). 
Useful biographical material can also be deducted from the 
Encomiastic Oration on Basil of St Ephrem the Syrian (306? 
+373) and especially from the Bibliotheca of the Patriarch of 
Constantinople St Photius the Great (810-897) who supplies very 
crucial and notable descriptions of the person, the home, the 
career and the literary talent of Basil the Great.(?) 
s 
There is no agreed date on the birth of St Basil. It is 
calculated by approximation and by comparison with that of his 
friend, St Gregory the Theologian. Gregory's Epistle 33 informs 
us that he was a little older than Basil and most probably not 
more than a year. The same Epistle also informs us that 
Gregory's father, also called Gregory, was made bishop of 
Nazianzus in AD 328 and that it was during his episcopate there 
that his son Gregory the Theologian was born. On this basis and 
taking into consideration other factors scholars argue that the 
most possible date for the birth of Gregory is the year 330. 
Thus Basil too must have been born around this date. 
There is no consensus on the place of Basil's birth. The 
most common view is that he was born at Caesarea in 
Cappadocia where he also became Metropolitan. Gregory the 
Theologian does not mention Basil's place of birth and Gregory 
of Nyssa states that it was possibly in Neocaesarea. (8) This view 
is also hinted at by Basil himself on a certain occasion when he 
went to this region to avoid the attention of Atarvios(9) and his 
men and told the people there of his happy memories of the 
place from his early years and of his joy to be again with 
relatives who were still there, his sister Macrina and his brother 
Peter.{lO) 
In other writings of Basil, however, there are strong 
indications that he was born in Pontus. First of all in his Epistle 
37 he writes to an unknown official of Pontus about "a friend 
who was son of the lady who fed him as a baby" to whom his 
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family had left a plot of land and servants, asking that the 
remuneration paid to them should be maintained to the same 
level. He also hints in this Epistle that he had spent his early 
years there and that he was possibly .born there. On the other 
hand in his Epistle 36, which he also addresses to an unknown 
official, possibly the same person with Presbyter Dorotheos, to 
whom he wrote the Epistles 86 and 87, he refers to an earlier 
Epistle (i.e. Ep. 86) as an Epistle "sent to the leader of the 
fatherland" (em£outA.a 8£ Kai. ·~ apxov'tt •nc; na'tpi8oc;). The 
phrase "leader of the fatherland" refers to the Governor of 
Pontus, and not of Cappadocia since, whenever he referred to 
Cappadocia he spoke of "our fatherland" ( •flc; na'tpi8oc; ru .. t(;)v). 
Besides, the fact that he was 1fostered' by a woman at Pontus 
indicates that Basil was probably born there and not at Caesarea 
in Cappadocia which lies many days of travelling away. 
Basil's parents were Basil the elder and Emmelia. His father 
was of noble and rich ancestry ~lho was distinguished for his 
uprightness and Christian ideals. He exercised the profession of a 
lawyer at Neocaesarea of Pontus. His mother Emmelia was also 
descendant from a pious family. Her father had died as a martyr 
at Caesarea in Cappadocia. Both parents were distinguished by 
their physical crun~iness, their virtues, their philanthropic 
activities, their wealth and their being blest with a goodly 
progeny. They had 9,(11) or 10 children, four males - Basil 
(330?), Naucratios (332), Gregory (334) and Peter (345) - and 
five or six females - among whom the most distinguished was 
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Macrina (born c. 362). Three of the four males (Basil, Gregory 
and Peter) dedicated themselves to the ministry of the Church, 
all of them becoming bishops, while Naucratios became a monk 
and died at the age of 27.(12) Macrina dedicated herself to the 
church as a "Virgin" after the death of her fiance, and in 345/50 
she founded a monastery for females in the family estate by the 
river Iris at Pontus and became a prototype of an ascetic. 
Basil, then, belonged to a noble family of Cappadocia, 
which offered to the Church some very distinguished theologians 
and ecclesiastical leaders. 
The first teachers and paedagogues of Basil were his mother 
Emmelia(13) and his paternal grand-mother Macrina. As he 
himself tells us in his Epistle 204, the character of his powerful 
personality, his overall virtuous life and :h~s perfect model o..s a 
'\ 
man, were all formed on the basis of the prototype of his 
grand-mother Macrina, although Emmelia's contribution to this 
was also considerable. As far as his education goes, Basil was 
taught the first elements by his own father,(14) who was a 
distinguished teacher of rhetoric at Neocaesarea. To complete his 
--~en e.n:d paedeia he was sent to Caesarea in Cappadocia at the 
age of twelve or thirteen (3411343), where he probably stayed 
with close relatives. This is where he met with Gregory (called 
later the Theologian), Hilarion(15) and Sophronios,(16) as well 
as with Julian (called later The Apostate). After the completion 
of his ~tYierue studies at Caesarea Basil was sent by his pious 
and rich parents to Constantinople (c. 346/7) for higher studies, 
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where he met Libanius,(17) who was 35 years old and had 
already made a name for himself. When Libanius was removed 
-i7he 
from his position, because his school had double number of 
pupils compared to that of Nicocles who was supported by the 
imperial court, Basil left Constantinople and went to Athens to 
continue his studies, since Athens, as Gregory the Theologian 
says, was the "soil of reason" ('to 'twv t..6y(J)v £&x<poc;;).(18) At 
Athens, where the study of classical philosophy was still 
maintained, and with the help of Gregory the Theologian, whom 
he found there and with whom he formed very close ties of 
friendship,(19) he came to study at the famous public schools of 
renown sophists(20) like Himerios(21) and Proaeresios.(22) 
Gregory spared Basil the tests which the junior students 
suffered in the hands of the seniors and helped him to find 
quickly his way around and to lodge in the same house as he; 
as a consequence of this they became "one soul in two bodies" 
and "one mind in two, not two"(23). Gregory refers to their 
studies at Athens, in several of his Poems and Orations, which 
ended up four or five years later, possibly in July 356, at which 
point Basil returned to his native land. He did so because he 
was informed that his father was critically ill. 
Tradition and modern research(24) have it that Basil 
exercised in Caesarea, after his return from Athens, the 
profession of a "teacher of rhetoric" for a period of four years. 
It was during this period that his fame travelled all over the 
region of Asia, because, as his friend Gregory the Theologian 
9 
says, he was most successful in his work so that his words were 
heard like thunder and his life appeared to be as bright as a 
lightening. Yet, Basil could not continue on this profession, 
i~pite of his tremendous success. He abandoned all civil 
functions, especially after the announcement of the death of his 
younger brother Naucratios, who was a monk at Pontus. (25) 
The study of philosophy taught Basil the deeper meaning of 
life and his religious upbringing taught him the secret of youth. 
Thus we see him taking the great decision to remain celibate. 
The light of the Gospel shone so brightly inside him that he 
began to understand the vanity and uselessness of secular 
pursuits and offices. In 358 he was baptised, whereupon he 
dedicated himself to the study of Christian literature in which he 
discovered a different light from that of the pagan classics. As a 
result he decided to continue his studies on another level and in 
another direction in order to come to know in a better and 
more decisive way both Christianity and Christian asceticism. He 
visited the most important ascetical centres from the Cyrenaic 
region to the Thebaid. He went round Syria, Mesopotamia, 
Palestine and Egypt,(26) where he probably met Athanasius who 
was in exile in the desert and Eustathius of Sebaste. The benefit 
of these visits was immeasurable. When in 359 he returned to 
Caesarea he could not help but embrace asceticism and imitate 
those venerable persons of the desert whom he had met. At the 
same time he was ordained to the Diaconate, but because his 
Bishop Dianius of Caesarea moved to the camp of the Arians, 
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he distributed his wealth to the poor of his country and 
departed to the Pontic deserts as a monic This took place 
around 360 and not earlier, as most of the modern patrologists 
tell us. In 363/4(27) hew~ persuaded to leave the quiet resort of 
his hermitage and to return to the service of the Church of his 
fatherland. He was ordained to the Presbyterate by Eusebius and 
assumed manifold responsibilities. In 370 Eusebius of Caesarea 
died and Basil was elected as his successor. As a Bishop he 
made many efforts to unite the Church from the East to the 
West, which was being shaken by many disputes. He attempted 
to bring together all the orthodox Bishops in East and West as a 
common front against heresy. During the relatively brief course 
of his episcopate he came to be greatly distinguished for his 
struggle against the Arians and for his great ecclesiastical, 
theological and social-political contributions. 
St Basil became "Great" not only as an ecclesiastical 
organizer and teacher, but also as a scientist, inasmuch as he 
represented a rare combination of a theoretical and a practical 
spirit, of idealist enthusiasm and down to earth realism, of 
knowledge and love, which can be found only in exceptional 
geniuses. Bringing together practical talent, philosophical thought 
and theological exactness, he delved into the depths of Christian 
truth and into the secrets of the physical world, "bringing out 
the magnitude of natural beings" ( 1:nv qn}ot v 1:(;)v 6v1:<Uv 
£1:p6:v<Uoac;) as we sing in one of the hymns of his feast, and 
commended himself to the consciousness of the Church as a 
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prototype of a pastor, author and theologian. 
St Basil inaugurated his literary activity in his hermitage at 
Pontus, where he studied the works of Origen, as an 
introduction to his theological studies, and where, together with 
Gregory, he wrote the Philocalia of Origen, consisting of a 
selection of some of the best passages from Origen's works con-
cerning the right interpretation of Holy Scripture.(28) He always 
tried to structure his writings in a pleasing way to both reader 
and listener. His integrity of character, his critical mind, his 
clear and pure spirit, his gifted personality, and also his clarity, 
natural idiom and brevity, are the particular virtues of Basil's 
style, which are rarely combined in such a powerful way in any 
other ecclesiastical author. 
In his writings he follows a systematic method and is 
obviously influenced by his classical education. He is not an 
atticist, but he uses clear and graceful language, being easy to 
understand even by the most humble of his listeners. Theologic-
ally he is patristic and traditional, following mainly Athanasius, 
but also going a little beyond him by clarifying his central 
theological precepts. 
St Basil left a variety of writings: dogmatic, apologetic, 
hermeneutical, ascetical, paedagogical, liturgical, particular 
treatises and a great number of Homilies and Epistles. The 
enormous influence exerted by these writings, and the profit 
gained from them, are fully demonstrated by the plethora of 
manuscripts which have come down to us and by the fact that 
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all these works have been transmitted without any senous 
alterations or corruptions. It is a pity that we do not yet possess 
a critical comprehensive edition of all the writings of Basil. 
There are good signs however of such a task becoming more 
and more possible. Such signs include the comprehensive history 
of editions and manuscripts of the late E. Amand de Mendieta, 
and the studies of J. Gribomont and Stig Y. Rudberger (cf. 
Bibliography). 
In view of all this one understands why St Basil is the first 
Hierarch to be mentioned in the Conclusion of the Divine 
Liturgy of the Orthodox Church and why Metropolitan John 
(Mavropous) of Euchaita (lith century) included him, together 
with St Gregory the Theologian and St John Chrysostom, in the 
special Feast and Acolouthy of the Three Great Hierarchs of the 
Eastern Church, attributing to them all the title of "ecumenical 
teacher" ( oi KO'UilEVt Koc; 8t &XoK<XAoc;) and to Basil, the designation 
"one who appeared from heaven" ( oupo:voqx):v'tcup ). 
Basil's life was cut short at an early age. This was caused 
by various factors, including his weak constitution, the severity 
of his asceticism, the heavy burden of his episcopal duties, the 
exigencies and disappointments from his clashes with the heretics 
po@.,I;Cdl.. 
and the persons of A power, the efforts and anxiety for the unity 
of the Churches, the special care and anguish for the poor of 
the Basileiad and, generally, his struggle for the preservation of 
orthodoxy. In 378, although he could consolidate his mighty 
work after the death of Valens in 378, unfortunately he had no 
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more physical strength left to him. In November and December 
of that year he was confined to his bed I being critically ill. He 
died on the first of January of 379, ~~g ordained(29) many 
of his genuine disciples to the priesthood and thus ensuring that 
they would continue his effort for the Gospel, the World and 
the Church. 
hcwe. 
Several scholars"-attempted to evaluate St Basil's character. 
Most of them recognized the uniqueness of his character and 
stressed the complexity and resourcefullness of his personality. 
Erasmus found him comparable to many great personalities of 
classical antiquity, Pericles, Lysias, !socrates, Demosthenes.(30) 
The Patrologist Otto Bardenhewer called him a "Roman among 
the Greeks".(31) The late Prof. Constantine Bonis of the 
University of Athens saw him as "the epitome of every synthesis 
of faith and knowledge". Prof. Stylianos Papadopoulos of the 
same University sees him as "the answer, from beginning to end, 
to the challenges and crises of his time, who did what he did in 
order to heal wounds, usually of spiritual nature, but sometimes 
material ones as well".(32) But it~<U Gregory the Theologian, his 
life-long friend, who gave us the best description of Basil's 
character. "He had a greater education than his age warranted, 
and he exhibited a solidity of ethos which was greater than his 
education. He was a rhetor among rhetors, even before the 
thrones of the sophists; a philosopher among philosophers, even 
before the dogmas of philosophy; above all, a Christian Priest, 
before he entered the priesthood; he was such that he was 
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acknowledged by all in am{33)... Virtue was his comeliness; 
theology, his grandeur; restlessness, which leads as far as God, 
his way; sowing and spreading of the word, his power".(34) The 
apolytikion {dismissal hymn) of his feast day, states that "he 
beautified the manners of human beings", that ''he mingled 
together the virtues of all the saints" and that he emerged as 
the type of "the royal prieshood". It is not surprising that the 
Orthodox Church has placed him first in the chorus of the 
Ecumenical Fathers and Teachers of Orthodox Christianity and 
calls him "Heavenly appearance" ( oupavo¢v't(,.)P ). 
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(2) St Basil's chronological charter 
c.320-330 Birth of St Basil at Caesarea, Cappadocia. 
330-335 Basil's transportation to Annisa of Pontus and delivery 
to his foster mother. 
335-337 Basil's return to Neocaesarea for his elementary educa-
tion which he received from his father. 
342-346 Basil receives his encyclical education in Caesarea. 
346-347 Basil departs to Constantinople for higher studies. 
347-350 Basil's studies with Libanius(?) 
3511352 Basil departs to Athens to pursue further studies along 
with his friend Gregory the Theologian. 
355 Basil and Gregory the Theologian meet with Julian the 
future emperor and Apostate. 
356 Basil's return to Caesarea from Athens. 
356/8 Basil as "Advocate" and "Teacher" of Rhetoric at Caes-
area and subsequently pilgrim to various monastic centres in 
Syria, Palaestine, Egypt and Mesopotamia. 
358 Basil's return to Caesarea and his invitation to Gregory 
to join him as a monk at Pontus. 
359 Basil's baptism by Bishop Dianius of Caesarea, and ele-
vation to the office of Reader. 
360 Basil joins his Bishop at a synod in eonsWople which 
dealt with Eunomius. He then departs to Iris to st'afi his mona-
stic career. 
360/2 Basil is joined by Gregory and writes his first ascetical 
writings and the Philocalia. 
362 Basil visits Caesarea on the occasion of Dianius' death 
and the elevation of Eusebius, who ordains him presbyter against 
his will. 
363 Basil returns to Pontus and is joined again by Gregory. 
363/4 Basil completes his work Anatreptikos against Eunomius 
and is ordained Presbyter by Eusebius. 
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365 Basil returns to Caesarea on account of Valens' proari-
an policy · and engages in manifold pastoral and literar-
y activity. 
367-70 Basil continues his manifold ministry in Caesarea, 
including care for the poor and the victims of the famine of 
368. 
370 Eusebius of Caesarea dies and Basil succeeds him in 
the Metropolitical throne. 
372 Basil's dialogue with the Prefect Modestus. 
372 Basil ordains his friend Gregory the Theologian Bishop 
of Sassima and his younger brother Gregory Je the episcopate of 
Nyss~, and rebuilds ~he Basileiad, the r~nQwnA.institution of, s~cial 
p..!Q_Ylde-nee. Valens 1S persuaded by Modestus · to send Basil mto 
-exile, but this plan fails because Basil heals Galates the son of 
Valens. 
373 A new edict of Valens sends Basil into exile, which, 
however, is not put into effect, because the pen of Valens is 
broken three times as he attempts to sign it. 
374 Basil ordains Amphilochius Bishop of Iconium and 
commences writing his book On the Holy Spirit to Amphilochius 
against the Pneumatomachi. 
375 Basil composes canons of church discipline, and com-
pletes his treatise On the Holy Spirit. 
378 The last year in Basil's life. He ordains successors for 
his work. 
379 1 January, Basil's death at t]?.e age of c 50 years old. 
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(3) St Basil's Anotreptikos 
Basil's Anatreptikos ( · Ava'tP£1t't t Koc:;; 'tou 3AnoA.oym t Kou 'to\> 
8uaa£ J}ouc:;; EuvoiJ. i ou) consisting of three Discourses ( A6yot ) , is 
his first dogmatic work and clearly has a dogmatic antirrhetical 
character. It was written most probably at the ascetical resort of 
Iris between 363-364. This clearly appears in his Epistle 20, 
which is dated between 364 and 365, and also in Gregory of 
Nyssa's Contra Eunomium (Ka'tex Euvo~J,iou) who, writing in 378, 
certifies that Basil wrote his work fourteen years ago, i.e. c. 
364. 
The occasion for the composition of this work was provided 
by Eunomius himself who published his own Apologetikos, 
according to some in AD 361 (Quasten, Vaggione), i.e. one year 
after the (predominantly Arian) Synod of Constantinople (360) 
which vindicated him, or according to others (Kopecek) in 
360.(35) This work, as Basil calls it in his Epistle to Leontius 
the sophist, is a "child's play" (nat8ux) or "a little more than a 
child's play" (IJ.tKPQ nat8tac:;; 01tou8at6upa). It seems that St 
Basil uses this characterization because he believes, as his 
.Anatreptikos shows, that every attempt of the mind to penetrate 
into the substance of God and to speak about it with rational 
arguments can only be likened to "child's play". Basil does not 
allow matters which are ineffable to be approached by 
rationalism, because the result of such a procedure could only 
be to the detriment of the person who adopts it. God's 
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revelation, being such an ineffable matter, can be approached 
only by faith and as far as God allows, with the means provided 
by God and not just with the means of human impertinence. 
The same approach is adopted by all the great theologians of 
the Church, whose thought is fed by faith and whose faith is 
based on God's gift of revelation. In our view it is Basil's great 
commitment to this approach that makes him write with such 
passion against Eunorn.ius. 
The real cause for the composition of Basil's Anatreptikos is 
to be found in the spiritual turmoil and confusion which 
Eunomius introduced into the faithful through the publication of 
his Apologetikos, inasmuch as he cast serious doubts as to the 
consubstantiality ( 61loouot6'tnc;) of the three persons of the 
Trinity and argued that these persons exist as three 
'hetero-ousian' (different in substance) hypostaseis. 
-Basil's purpose in writing against Eunomius was to persuade 
him to return to the right faith and to strengthen those who 
remained faithful to orthodoxy. At the same time he wanted to 
expose the blasphemy of Eunomius "against the high glory of 
the only-begotten Son of God" ('tilV rll\.aocpnlliav nv Eic; 'to uwoc: 
'ti'IC: 86~nc; 'to\> MovoyEvouc; £A.aA.noEv Or.l.l.) and the Holy Spirit. 
He believed that he could do this by removing the outward 
covers of the seemingly rational foundation of Eunorn.ius' views. 
It is generally accepted that Basil's work is a continuation of 
the work of the great Athanasius and constitutes the basis of 
Cappadocian theology. Its content, which will be fully analyzed 
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below, can be briefly summarized in the following way:(36) 
The First Discourse begins with a brief discussion of 
Eunomius' faith and his insistence that God's substance ( ouoio:) 
is identical with the notion of "the ingenerate" ('to ay£vvmov) --
which includes other related notions, such as "the beginningless" 
( 1:o avo:pxov ), or "the eternal" ('to o:iQvt ov ), or "the immutable" 
{'to avo:A.Aoi c.>- 1:ov) or "the unpartitioned" ( 1:o Cq.J.£pt o1:ov) -- and 
~ 
describes or qualifies the Father alone. St Basil first points out 
that this notion is not found in Holy Scripture and that its real 
origin is Aristotle's philosophy, and then argues that it is 
actually misused by Eunomius because it denotes either the 
relation of one object to another, or a partial feature of an 
object itself as opposed to its substance ( ouoio:). This means that 
God's substance cannot be identical with the characteristic 
feature of the "ingenerate", which, in point of fact, denotes and 
constitutes an apophatic feature of God, like other related 
features, such as the "beginning less", the "immutable", etc., 
which describe and qualify not only the Father but also the Son. 
For St Basil these apophatic features reveal the weakness of 
human reason and generally man's incapacity to understand the 
substance of God. God's substance, therefore, cannot be his 
ingenerateness because it is utterly incomprehensible and 
undefinable. Besides, the "ingenerate" denotes operation 
(£v£pyno:v) or manner of existence (1:p6nov \map~E<Uc;) and not 
substance ( ouoi a:) or nature ( qn)ot c;). It denotes the relation of 
one thing to another, namely, of God the Father to the Son and 
il 
!j 
I; 
I 
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to the Spj;l.t. It tells us how God is in relation to the Son and 
;' 
the SRirlt, but not what he is. /, 
,..:""' 
In the Second Discourse Basil defends and elaborates the 
consubstantiality ('to o~J,oouot ov) of the Son with the Father. 
Eunomius claims that the Son was born out of nothing, before 
all the other creatures. For St Basil this amounts to a denial of 
the source of life and leads to atheism (Anatreptikos 2.2. PG 
29:576B). The substantial feature or property of the "ingenerate" 
is not denied by the attribution of the property of the 
"generate" ('to yEvvn't6v) to the person of the Son. To explain 
the Son's consubstantiality with the Father St Basil argues that 
the Son is nowhere mentioned in the Scriptures as a "thing 
made" (y£vn1J.cx), or "creature" (noiniJ.CX), but as a Son (Yi6<;;). 
Far from being a creature the Son is the living icon (image) of 
the invisible God. He is self-life, preserving exactly the identity 
of substance with the Father. This means that he is 
consubstantial with the Father and that as such he is also 
without beginning and eternal. It also means that the Son is not 
the product of God's will, nor did he come into being in time, 
but has been eternally born and exists beside the Father. 
In the Third Discourse Basil deals with the orthodox 
doctrine of the third person of the Holy Trinity, the Holy 
Spirit, against the views of Eunomius. He argues that the Spirit 
is not a creature but shares in the same honour and dignity with 
the Father and the Son. "If one [in this case Eunomius] moves 
from the creatures to the understanding of the substance of 
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God, then, one would find the Son to be a creation of the 
ingenerate and the Paraclete a creation of the Only-begotten". 
But on the basis of Scripture, tradition and reason, one can 
easily establish that the Paraclete not only is not a creature, but 
has the nature of the Father and the Son, constituting a separate 
hypostasis, and being Lord, as the Son, sanctifying and 
enlightening. Thus, like the Father and the Son, he too has all 
in common with them by nature, i.e. goodness, uprightness, 
holiness, life, etc. He is not numbered with many others, like 
the angels, but is seen in the Trinity. What, however, Basil does 
not acknowledge, unlike Athanasius, his mentor, and Gregory 
the Theologian, his friend, is the horrwousion of the Holy Spirit 
to the Son and to the Father. He avoids using this term, as he 
explains elsewhere, for pastoral reasons, and not because he has 
doubts about the true Godhead of the Spirit. 
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PART IT: 
INTRODUCTION TO EUNOMIUS 
( 4) Eunomius: A brief biographical Memorandum 
Eunomius the Galatian(37) was born in 325? (or 330? or 
333?) at the village of Dakoura in Cappadocia of a father who 
was some sort of landowner. Gregory of Nyssa who knew him 
from his youth tells us that his father was a farmer and a very 
likeable person and that his only impediment was his son!(38) 
Having received his preliminary education from his father, 
Eunomius went, at the prompting of the Arian Bishop Secundus, 
to Antioch and later, in 356, to Alexandria, where he studied 
for nearly two years under the Arian Aetius,(39) whom he 
succeeded in 367 as leader of the Anomoeans.(40) 
In 358, having been condemned by the Council of Ancyra 
(358) and following an invitation by Eudoxius of Antioch, he 
came/ together with Aetius)to Antioch where he cooperated with 
Eudoxius in spreading the teaching of the Anomoeans. In the 
same year he was ordained to the Diaconate by Eudoxius, with 
whom he had been closely associated, and in 360 he was elected 
by the Arians as Bishop of Cyzicus. Eudoxius had urged 
Eunomius to conceal the heretical teaching of his teacher Aetius, 
but he failed to keep the suggestion of his protector. As a 
consequence he was deposed and then exiled) first under the 
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emperor Valens (369170) and later, after his reinstatement, in 
379, by Theodosius I. While in exile he went to various places, 
such as Mauritania, Naxos, Mysia and Caesarea in Cappadocia. 
Eunomius died, most probably, during 393-394 at a very old 
age and the oration on his funeral was delivered by the 
semi-Arian historian Philostorgius. ( 41) 
Eunomius co~se..d many_ ~itings, most of which were of 
dogmatic and antirrhetical character. Only a few of these have 
C)""~ 
survived as "";""" ~o.&.e- 4 most~ condemned heretics. Succes-
sive imperial edicts from 398 prohibited their circulation and 
recommended their destruction. Socrates, the historian, mentions 
Eunomius' Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans and fvty 
treatises in the form of Epistles, ( 42) which were also known to 
Photius. None of these have survived to this day. The only 
writings which still survive are: 1) his Apologetikos ( · Ano-
A.o}'1l'ttK6<;)(43) which he published in 361 after his elevation to 
the episcopate and which, according to Photius, was circulated 
only amongst his followers, because his opponents had banned it 
from their ranks. In this work he expounded his views on God's 
"ingenerateness" (ayE:vvnoia) and the Son's "anomoeanism" 
(av6j..l.otov). 2) The Expositio Fidei (~EKSE:ot<: nto't£(&)<;) which he 
handed in to the Emperor Theodosius in 383. 3) His work 
Apologetikos for the Apologetikos ( · AnoA.oy{a \nt£p · AnoA.o-
y{a<;),(44) which he wrote over a period of years as a response 
to Basil's criticisms without, however, publishing it as long as 
Basil was alive, and which is preserved in extensive quotations 
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by Gregory of Nyssa in his refutation of it, his celebrated 
Antirrhetikos. Photius knew only three books of this 
Apology,(45) whereas Philostorgius, much earlier, spoke of five 
books.(46) 
(5) Eunomius's Chronological charter 
325? Eunomius' birth at Dakoura of Cappadocia. 
356 Eunomius goes to Alexandria and studies under Aetius. 
358 Eunomius is ordained Deacon by Eudoxius of Antioch. 
360 Eunomius is ordained Bishop of Cyzicus by Eudoxius in 
place of Aetius but is soon removed from there following 
protests from his clergy and people. 
361/3 Eunomius writes his Apologetikos. 
365/6 Eunomius is exiled by Valens to Mauritania and 
subsequently to Naxos because of his relations with the usurper 
of the throne Procopius. 
367 Eunomius succeeds Aetius and becomes the indisputable 
leader of the Anomo.eans. 
369 Eunomius is exiled by the Emperor Valens. 
378 Eunomius publishes his Apologetikos for the Apologetikos. 
379 Eunomius is exiled by Theodosius I. 
381 Eunomius is condemned by the Second Ecumenical Synod 
of Constantinople. 
383 Eunomius participates in the Synod of Constantinople and 
submits his Expositio Fidei to Emperor Theodosius, by whom he 
is, later on, exiled to Mysia and later to Caesarea of 
Cappadocia. 
393/5 Possible death of Eunomius. 
25 
( 6) Eunomius's Apologetik.os and his place in Arianism 
The occasion for the composition of the Apologetikos of 
Eunomius was allegedly provided by Eunomius' "accusers" 
(Ka,;flyopot),(47) who, however, are not mentioned, as well as 
the "false accusations" which were made of him. ( 48) There is a 
double aim m this book: the defence 1) of the monarchy of 
God and 2) of the harmonious order of the universe. The order 
of the universe, as he says, could be: God = ultimate cause of 
the universe. Only-begotten Logos = offspring of God and 
Creator of all things. Spirit = first creation of the Logos. On 
this basis he rejected both the homoousion of the Logos and the 
Godhead of the Holy Spirit. 
The real reason, however, for the composition of the 
Apologetikos is given by St Basil. He wants to hide the fact that 
he expounds his dogmas wholly willfully, in case he is not taken 
seriously by many of his readers, and so he pretends that it was 
by necessity that he wrote what he wrote.(49) In other words 
he wanted to have a real pretext for propagating his own 
blasphemy, which he had accepted for some time. He writes an 
apology in order to avoid the charge of innovation (Kat vo,;oi.J.ia) 
a.. 
which amounts to heresy and to attract greater audience, since 
1\ 
human beings naturally are sympathetically disposed towards 
those who are persecuted and pay greater attention to their 
arguments. This becomes very clear in the 11Prooimion" of the 
Apologetikos where he explicitly states that he wants to uncover 
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the lie of the slanderers and evil men and to protect the 
innocence of the many, upholding the pious tradition of the 
fathers (tnv 8£ KP<X'touoav Kat Kav6va ltPOEK9EIJ.EVot ).(50) To 
certify this he cites at the very start his confesion of faith: 
"We believe in one God the Father, Almighty, from 
whom are all things, and in one only-begotten Son of God, 
God the Logos, our Lord Jesus Christ, through whom are 
AA 
all things, and in oneASpirit, the Paraclete".(51) 
And as he himself goes on to tell, there is one God alone, 
who is not created either by himself or by anybody else, and 
consequently he is bound up with ingenerateness ~~_, rath~rj his. 
substance is ingenerateness itself ( aKoA.ou9Ei 'to-0'tr...i 'to 
"' 
aytVVl)'tOV, IJ,<XA.A.ov 8£ mno EO'tt ouo{a llyEVVl)'to<;).(52) 
Eunomius based his teaching on the teaching of Arius, who 
stressed that God is one, alone ingenerate and ever existing: 
"we know of one God, alone ingenerate, alone ever 
existing, alone without beginning, alone having 
immortality". (53) 
Next to God there is no other being. There is inside him, 
however, an impersonal power, his Wisdom and Logos. Arius' 
teaching is derived from the dynamic monarchianism of Paul of 
Samosata, and it is also related to some extent with the 
doctrines of the Apologists and with echoes of the teachings of 
the Gnostics. 
According to Arius God was alone only up to a point 
(apparently a point in eternity for there was no time in God!), 
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before which he was not a father. "God was not always a 
father, but became a father afterwards".(54) He became a father 
when he decided to create the world, and on this account he 
created a certain being, who is called Son. This being, as Arius 
contends, came into existence out of nothing and, hence, he is a 
creature. "The Logos of God himself came into being out of 
nothing, and there was when he was not and he was not before 
he came to be, but he too had a beginning of being created. 
For God was alone and there was not yet any Logos or 
Wisdom. Afterwards though, when he decided to create us, then 
he created a certain being and called him Logos, Wisdom and 
Son, in order to create us through him".(55} 
Consequently, Christ, as Arius contends in his Thalia,(56) is 
not God. "Neither is the Logos true God", compared to God the 
Father. This is why not only does he not know the Father 
perfectly, but neither does he know his own substance. Again 
Christ is not God, even when compared to human beings. He is 
only a "perfect creature". He became a "strong god" through 
moral progress and the operation of divine grace. On the above 
basis, the present world begins with the creation of the Son. 
The Son is the first-fruits of creation. God did not create the 
world directly, but created the Logos so that the Logos may 
create the world. The Logos was created before all things. 
Ultimately, however, "the Logos came to be out of nothing and 
there was when he was not".(57} 
The Son, then, is not true God, in relation to whoever or 
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whatever, and for this reason all his characteristic features are 
relative, since he has limited knowledge, inasmuch as he neither 
sees nor knows the Father and, furthermore, is mutable like 
man. "And as to his nature, like all the rest, the Logos too is 
mutable, but through his own self-determination, as long as he 
wills it, he remains good. When, however, he wants to, he can 
change, being like us of a mutable nature".(58) To defend this 
teaching Arius used the verse from the book of Proverbs, "The 
Lord created me, a. beginning of all his ways" (Prov. 8:22).(59) 
This teaching of Arius, supported by Aetius and Eunomius, 
caused havoc in the Church. It was regarded as a major assault 
on Christianity, since Arius and his followers separated God 
from Christ. 
The Church's reaction to the Arian heresy was powerfully 
expressed through the Council of Nicaea (325) which condemned 
Arius and his followers and articulated the apostolic and catholic 
consciousness, the apostolic faith and experience, the apostolic 
and catholic tradition. The Synod did not create something new, 
but simply expressed and articulated the ancient faith of the 
Church which was kept like a sacred earlum in the charismatic 
life of the Church through the Holy Spirit. This catholic faith 
was expressed by the strong term horrwousios. . IJ •. 
~·t (,Y\"jiVl ~....., 
The word horrwousios expresses that ,\'antinomian" seed of 
the Christian understanding of life, the "one name", the "name 
of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit", as distinct from the 
three names of the Father, the Son and the Spirit!. The fathers 
29 
of Nicaea expressed by this term the substance of Christianity. 
This is in fact the mystery of theology, namely, the fact that 
Christ is true God, homoousios to God the Father and, hence, 
Saviour, Redeemer, Lord. ( 60) 
Like Arius, so Eunomius came to say that the Father was a 
"perfect monad", "a God infinitely one", who does not admit of 
any kind of participation in his Godhead and no kind of 
transposition from the one substance to the three hypostaseis. 
Birth would have meant for God corruption of his simple 
substance. Thus birth cannot mean anything else, except 
creation. Arius, like Eunomius~) attempted to adopt the methods 
and means of philosophy which are according to human 
perception as methods and means for the knowledge of Christ 
and God, or to place the fallen human mind as the measure for 
assessing the work of Christ by grace, or to replace by means 
of rationalist rules the Christian laws of the Holy Spirit. Both 
Arius and Eunomius wanted to 'undeify', as it were, the 
God-man, thus clearly demonstrating that they sided with the 
opposition of the devil as seen in the Gospel. They tried, as St 
Athanasius says, to interpret the Holy Scriptures "according to 
their own mind"(61) and not "according to the mind of 
Christ".(62) They measured Christ by themselves and thus made 
Christ like themselves. They measured by their nature the nature 
of the infinite and thus dragged it down to the level of a 
created nature. As St Athanasius again says, "the Arians 
co-enumerate themselves with the Greeks," because "they 
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worship creation instead of the Creator",(63) teaching that Christ 
is a creature. But it is clear that Eunomius based his own theses 
on those of Arius, as we mentioned above. If we accept that 
Christ is not God, then, what else can one suppose, except that 
he is a deceiver, since he deceives when he says, "I and my 
Father are One".{64) 
Both Arius and Eunomius attempted to understand God in 
Christ logically. They attempted to move into the central dogma 
of the faith by means of a predetermined mind-set, forgetting 
that to attempt to know, or interpret, God with a sinful mind, 
is to commit adultery of consciousness, since, in accordance 
again with the thought of St Athanasius, "the God who can be 
understood is not God". Thus the rejection of the Godhead of 
Christ and the impiety concerning his divine substance(65) is 
regarded by St Athanasius to be a blasphemy against the Holy 
Spirit. Again to reject the 1wmoousion of Christ means that you 
are not Christ's but Judas' because the Church calls Arius 
"second Judas". ( 66) 
Eunomius' views were critically evaluated and refuted by St 
Basil, St Gregory the Theologian, St Gregory of Nyssa, St John 
Chrysostom, Didymus the Blind, Apollinaris of Laodicea, 
Theodore of Mopsuestia and Cyril of Alexandria, but not all of 
these critical refutations have survived. It is not easy today to 
assess critically and objectively the views of Eunomius, not only 
because his writings have not survived entire, but also because 
his opponents, however illustrious and important they may be, 
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present Eunomius in a selective way and evaluate him from 
their own particular points of view. Yet, compared to other 
condemned heretics/' he seems to be in a better position as 
regards the objective presentation of his views, probably because 
he was both outspoken and fairly distinguished as a literary man. 
This is clearly seen in the various accounts of Eunomius which 
modem scholars have advanced and not least in his own 
surviving texts.(67) 
Obviously Eunomius' central concern in his teaching was the 
problem relating to the doctrine of God arising from the 
combination of this doctrine with the doctrines of the Son and 
the Holy Spirit. For him, as we have noted above, God is 
simple and incapable of partition and the main characteristic 
feature or property of his substance (his being) is his 
ingenerateness ( ayEvvnoicx} the key theological notion of 
Eunomius' system -- which actually specifies or even defines it. 
Though a negative or apophatic notion, this ingenerateness of 
God has for Eunomius a positive content, denoting what is 
self-existent, the so-called aseitas,(68) that being which in itself 
is the cause of its existence, if we are allowed to use a term 
from scholastic theology. Thus the notion of ingenerateness 
overrides the notion of God's substance so completely that it can 
be said that God does not know anything more than we already 
know. As Socrates, the historian, puts it: "As far as his own 
substance (being) is concerned, God does not know anything 
more than we do, inasmuch as this substance is not more known 
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to him and less known to us. Rather, what we may know about 
it, this is what he too certainly knows; and what he does know, 
this is what you may also find in us without any difference 
whatsoever". ( 69) 
Eunomius' opponents controverted this view by exposing his 
Aristotelian premises. They argued that, like Aetius and 
Theophronius, he too introduced an unrestricted application of 
philosophical premises to the doctrine of theology and, as a 
result, transformed the latter into "technology" ('u:xvoA.oyio:).(70) 
Eunomius' theological epistemology reveals his total commitment 
to rationalism, which reaches its excessive limits but is deprived 
of the religious element which is typical of the Platonic 
philosophical thought. His is a dialectic totally intellectualist, 
which is based on abstract ideas. 
Almost inevitably the Cappadocian counter-thesis against 
Eunomius' position was the emphasis on the ~omprehensibility 
I\ 
n 
and unknowability of the substance of God, which was defended 
on biblical and traditional grounds. God is known only through 
his "energies" which are impressed on the mind by God (hence 
their name: E:ni vot o:t ) and which are understood as "an heuristic 
intercourse with what is unknown, through both what preceeds 
and what follows, finding what follows on from the first 
perception of the object of inquiry", (71) i.e. as an operation 
which begins with an already existing perception of the object 
of inquiry and proceeds to a fuller perception of this object. 
Furthermore, the Cappadocians argued that the names of God 
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do retain their value, even though they have been found by 
means of the "perceptions" ( £ni vot ext ) • On the contrary 
Eunomius rejected both the perceptions and the names. The 
perceptions, he said, which were the invented or spurious names 
f h II has . II . . d h . 1 o uman stoc tic actiVIty, an as sue mere convent10na 
signs, had no objective value and could not lead to the 
knowledge of the object as such. If man was attached only to 
such perceptions, he would have to remain dumb, because he 
would not have the possibility to express any reality. 
Eunomius also argued that apart from the "perceptions" 
there are other names which are not products of human thought. 
These are objective names, or names of rational revelations, 
expressing the substance of their objects. Such names are given 
to things only by God himself. Such names, or rational seeds~ 
were given by God in the beginning when he created all things 
and the human soul. This claim reminds one of Plato's argument 
in the f::ratylus.(72) 
Ultimately, as we shall see in our analysis below, Eunomius' 
Apologetikos stands for the primacy of philosophical theology 
over against the theology of revelation which is given in the 
Gospel and the Apostolic kerygma. 
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PART ill 
AN ANALYSIS OF ST BASIL'S ANATREPTIKOS AGAINST 
EUNOMIUS 
(1) The Scope of the present research 
What we have gathered in the preceding part from the 
works of various scholars represents a very general picture of 
the theological debate between Basil and Eunomius -- a picture 
which is sufficient to attract our attention to a more thorough 
theological study. Given the fact that the major work which 
deals with this debate has not been translated into English and 
there is no thorough study on it beyond the essay of M. 
Anastos (cf. Bibliography), which, as he acknowledges, is only a 
summary and the short notes of Kopecek (cf. Bibliography), it 
was considered necessary to undertake this study of the original 
text, with the view to discovering the finer points of Basil's 
early thought on the Trinity, as that was shaped in dialogue 
with his most formidable- opponent, his Arian compatriot 
Eunomius, against whom not only himself, but also all other 
orthodox church leaders felt obliged to write. 
The particular task for this research is quite specific and 
perhaps somewhat limited, but this was deliberately determined 
by the restricted scope of the MA research programme. It 
hopefully serves as a beginning for a longer research which 
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would examine and assess all Patristic reactions to Eunomius. 
The method employed here is twofold: analytic and 
synthetic. We have sought first of all to provide an analytical 
exposition of the three Orations on the basis of the original text 
and keeping an eye on Anastos' useful summary, but schematiz-
ing the contents of our exposition so as to bring out the main 
theological theses of Eunomius and Basil's counter-theses. Then 
second, we have sought to gather together the anti-Eunomian 
Basilian data on the theme of Triadology with the view to 
providing a basis, as it were, for examining, in the future, if 
circumstances allow, the development of Basil's thought on the 
Trinity. 
There are obviously two clear premises, which have guided 
us m undertaking this research: first the conviction that Basil's 
views were shaped by his involvement in concrete debates with 
others, and second, that there is a historical development in his 
thought, which still needs to be recovered. Against the total 
-
contribution of the Great Basil to Trinitarian doctrine, this 
research is only initial, but as a Greek proverb has it, "the 
beginning is the half of the whole" ( i) apxn 'tO i'U...Lt au 'tOU 
1tO:V't6c;). 
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(2) AN ANALYSIS OF THE FIRST ORATION 
Introduction 
This First Oration is divided into 27 chapters (to be cited as 
Al,l-27) in which Basil attempts to refute Eunomius' arguments 
against "the height of the glory of the Only-Begotten" ('to U\lfO<: 
'tii<: 86~11<: 'to\> MovoyEvou<;;). In the Introduction (Al,l-5) he 
reveals the false or pretentious character of the title 
Apologetikos (Apology) which Eunomius attributed to his work 
and attempts to expose Eunomius' haughty spirit against the 
tradition and the earlier Christians. The citation of a Creed at 
the beginning of his work indicates Eunomius' desire to attract 
the initial approval of his readers. But his true intention is 
revealed in what follows: namely, Eunomius' "Aristotelian and 
Chrysippian syllogisms", as Basil calls them, which eventually 
lead to the rejection of the Godhead of Christ. 
The ingenerate Father 
Basil begins in Al,S with Eunomius' contention that by 
definition "the ingenerate Father was not born, either by himself 
or, by anyone else". He points out that, although the character-
isation of the Father as "ingenerate" ( (cy£vvn'to<;;) is conceivable 
by us, yet it is not met in the Scriptures and should be avoided 
because it can give rise to blasphemous thoughts; besides the 
term "ingenerate" is covered by the scriptural term "Father", 
inasmuch as he who is truly and uniquely "Father" is obviously 
not derived from anybody else but is "ingenerate". Indeed one 
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should avoid the designation "ingenerate" in preference to the 
designation "Father", lest one thinks that he can be wiser than 
the Lord himself who instituted that one "should be baptised in 
the name of the Father ... (Matth. 28:19)'! Clearly Basil's response 
to Eunomius' "ingenerate" is both biblical and liturgical and 
reminds one of similar responses of Athanasius to the Arians. 
Basil turns next to the Eunomian contention, that, "if 
neither the Father pre-existed himself, nor anything else", then 
the "ingenerate" is attributed only to him, or, rather, that his 
substance ( oooia) is the "ingenerate". Basil's response exposes a 
t 
logical fal~cy in this contention. To argue, as Eunomius does, 
that the "ingenerate" is attributable to the Father alone, is to 
acknowledge that this term is attributed to him from outside 
(f~t.>8Ev). In turn, however, what is "from outside" can never 
designate "being" ( ouoi a), but attribute ( i 8i c.lj...L(X). It is, in other 
words, Eunomius' own logic which leads to the opposite 
conclusion from that which he draws. But Eunomius is aware of 
this and hence he adds to his contention the phrase, "or, rather, 
that his substance is ingenerate". The problem, however, 
remains, as Basil points out, inasmuch as the "ingenerate" of 
Eunomius cannot be both attribute ( i 8{ c.lj...L(X) and substance 
( oooia). The "rather" of Eunomius' construction tones down this 
identification, but does not remove the contradiction. At the 
same time this contradictory contention exposes Eunomius' real 
intention. He wants to identify the substance of the Father with 
the "ingenerate", so that the Son's generateness might exclude 
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him from the Godhead. 
On the ingenerate and on concepts 
One would have thought that this would conclude Basil's 
disputation, yet Eunomius' subtlety demands further discussion. 
Eunomius apparently made a plea that the attribution of the 
"ingenerate" to the Father should not be regarded as a mere or 
empty concept (tnivota), but as a confession which 
acknowledges that he is what he is said to be. Indeed he 
implied by this, that, if no such acknowledgement was made, 
then the attribution of the "ingenerate" to the Father would be 
nothing else but a mere thought, which existed only when it 
was pronounced. 
It is clear, as Basil also observes, that Eunomius wanted by 
this plea to establish the identification of the "ingenerate" with 
God's substance and thereby exclude the Son from it who, as 
Son, must be generate. But Basil is ready to expose this subtlety 
also, and he does this by examining the notion of "concept" 
(£nivota), which lies at the very heart of Eunomius' plea. First 
of all the problem lies, says Basil, in that Eunomius understands 
a "concept" ( tni vot a) as nothing at all, or as something which 
exists only when it is pronounced, and also that he does not say 
whether the "ingenerate" is such a "concept" or not. Basil shows 
what "concepts" are by the way in which they are used (Cf. 
A1.6) i) in every day common experience and ii) in the Holy 
Scriptures (Cf. A1.7). 
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The common and the biblical usage of concepts 
i) "Concepts" are used in every day experience in two ways: 
a) in connection with things which exist, in which case they are 
simple or composite, as for example the "body with its parts", 
or the "grain of wheat with its various effects or uses, on 
account of which it can be called fruit, or seed, or food"; b) in 
connection with things which are imaginary constructions of the 
mind independently of things which exist. In the former case a 
"concept" is what remains in the mind after the first impression 
(or conception = v6nJ...Lcx) is made on it as a result of direct 
sensation or encounter of a real object; but it is also the 
particular concepts which emerge in the mind as constituents of 
this object, what Basil calls, what "are seen by/in the concept" 
( 9£c.>Pll'tCx Em voi <1). 
ii) The use of "concepts" in the Scriptures, says Basil, is 
not different from the use of them in common experience. This 
can be seeing from _ "<?ne and most crucial point" ( tvo<; 8£ J...L6vou 
Kcxi Kcxtptcu'ta'tou), namely, the way in which they are used to 
denote the Lord Jesus Christ. Although the Lord is one subject 
(t:v ~v KCX'ta 'to \moKEiJ...1.£vov), Scripture uses several idioms to 
describe the various aspects of the divine philanthropy and 
grace, which are derived from his "economy". Thus he is called, 
door, way, bread, vine, shepherd, light. Yet, the many names 
do not suggest that he is a "multiple construct" ( noA.ooV\JJ...I.o<:), 
but remains "one simple and inconiposite substance" (J...Licx oooicx 
CmAfl KCXi CxoUV9E'to<;). 
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Concepts and energies 
The different "concepts" ( E:ni votcn) implied by the variety 
of names are in fact connected with "the different energies" 
( 'tiW 't(;)v E:v£py£t(;)v Btcapopav) and the "different relations to 
those who are beneficiaries". Thus, as Basil explains, Christ is 
"light" because he reveals the unapproachable glory of his 
Godhead and because he enlightens the eyes of the soul of 
those who have been cleansed by the enlightenment of the 
divine knowledge. He is "vine", because he feeds those who are 
rooted in him with faith to do good works. He is "bread", 
because he sustains the constitution of the soul, keeping it form 
·~ 
psychical diseases, which result from lack of right judgment. 
Likewise, says Basil, all the names attributed to Christ are 
connected with a variety of energies, even though all of them 
presuppose one simple substance or subject. Basil argues that 
just as these "concepts" ( E:ni votcxt) are not empty notions, which 
are di~lved with the air as soon as they are pronounced, so 
every attribute that one attributes to God "by way of concepts" 
(Ka't' E:nivotav) cannot be empty of reality. 
The concept of the ingenerate and Eunomius' use of it 
The attribute of the "ingenerate" is such a "concept" 
(E:nivota) which is said of God in certain circumstances or 
relations. God is "ingenerate" ( av£vvmoc), because ''his 1ife 
transcends every beginning" ( \m£p£K1tt1t'touoav mxonc apxflc 
Eupi oKov'tEC 'ti1V Ccuiw 'to\> 8£oiJ ). Similarly he is "incorruptible" 
( l'Xcp9ap'toc), because "he is indefinable, infinite and without a 
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conceivable end" ('tov a6pt o'tov Kcxi. ann pov Kcxt ou8Evt 't£A.n 
KCX'tcxAnJt'tov Ttpoocxyop£uoj.u:v (up9cxp'tov ). Basil points out that both 
attributes, "ingenerate" and "incorruptible", are grasped by way 
of concepts in the mind ( E:Tti vot en) and denote idioms which are 
confessed to be really present in God. Thus, Eunomius' attempt 
to differentiate the "ingenerate" from the notion of "concept" in 
order to identify it with the substance of God is totally 
misleading and unacceptable. 
In Al ,8 Basil exposes the "hypocrisy" of Eunomius 
concerning the term "ingenerate". This is most clearly discerned 
from Eunomius' claim that he is not prepared "to praise God 
simply, according to human conception (Kcx't' E:Ttivotcxv 
avepumivnv), but to proceed further to what is due to God, 
namely to what he is in substance". The stress on the necessity 
to give to God what is due to him ( oq>A.rn.tcx'toc; EK'ttot v}, says 
Basil, has a double aim: it is a sort of threat, designed to affect 
the simple Christians, who may take it to mean that, unless they 
comply with it, they have actually failed to respond properly to 
God; and it is also a subtle challenge to the more intelligent 
Christians that to comply with this demand frees them from 
every obligation, whereas to fail to do so may expose them to 
the wrath of God. 
Basil's response: divine names 
Basil's response is initially "rhetorical". He asks whether 
Eunomius applies the same logic to other attributes of God, for 
this is the logical conclusion to his argumentation. In doing this, 
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he also points out how ridiculous it is to think of God's 
substance in terms of his "providence" ( 'tb Ttpovon't t K6v ), or 
God's "foreknowledge" ( 'tb Ttpoyvc.>o't t K6v ). 
The core of Basil's argument is that all the names applied 
to God (in effect, all the divine attributes), are of equal value, 
for, as he explains, this is what also applies to the case of 
human beings, where the many names applied to them, e.g. 
Simon, or Peter, or Cephas, do not imply difference of value. 
By the same token, says Basil, whoever hears that God 1s 
"immutable" ( 'tb CtVMAOt c.>'tOV ), will also assume that he 1s 
"ingenerate" as well; also, whoever hears that God is "without 
parts" ( 'tb Ou£P£<:), will be automatically led to God's "ability to 
create" ('tb 8~1J.toupytK6v). To distinguish the names ~'\ value 
'tht 
on account of~~ifference of meaning, says Basil, is to introduce 
absurdity and confusion and to deny the lead of the Spirit. 
Basil actually produces a full account of the difference of 
meaning enshrined in the various names attributed to God, using 
biblical examples, such as: Ps. 103:24 for God's creative artistry, 
or Ps. 144:16 for God's providence, or Ps. 17:12 for the 
invisibility of God's nature, or Mal. 3:6 for the immutability of 
God's substance. His conclusion is that, in spite of the difference 
of meaning, these names are of equal value, because they point 
to the same substance. But this exposes the futility of every 
attempt to separate any one of these names and identify it with 
God's very substance. All of them designate God's substance just 
as they also designate the Son's substance ·because they are 
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equally attributed to him. In turn this means that there is no 
dissimilarity in the Father and the Son as far it pertains to their 
substance. 
On philosophical and biblical grounds 
Having clarified this, Basil still realizes that he needs to 
expose more fully the grounds on which Eunomius has isolated 
Q!!!y the name of the "ingenerate", and has completely ignored 
all other names in his attempt to specify the divine substance. 
His answer is given in A1.9. Not only did Eunomius claim that 
the term <Xytvvn'toc;; is not an attribute, but he also argued that 
it should not be understood simply as privative (Kcnex o'ttpnot v), 
on account of the initial "ex" of the a-ytvvn'toc;;, because 
privation implies natural difficiency and follows a customary 
possession of something ( £~t c;;). 
Basil oberves that these thoughts are taken from Aristotle's 
"Categories" (15b and llb, where there is explanation of 
o'ttpnotc;; and £~tc;;), i.e. from the wisdom of this world, which, 
in Basil's view, is inapplicable when one deals with the teaching 
of the Spirit. Basil actually refers to John 8:44 and II Cor. 6:15 
to illustrate the radical nature of the contrast between the 
teaching of the Spirit and the wisdom of this world, and to 
emphasize that the latter is a lie as derived from one's .self or 
from the devil. But having said this, Basil makes an attempt to 
discuss further Eunomius's philosophical contention. He observes 
that what is said about the <Xytvvn'toc;; can also be said about 
other similar divine attributes, such as (xq)Ocxp'toc;;, a6pcx'toc;;, 
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O:o4.,ux'toc;, O:Elavcnoc;, etc. What is common to all these is the fact 
that they are privative in characte~ as the initial "a" indicates, 
i.e. they indicate what God is not or cannot be, rather than 
what he is. They are negative or apophatic and do not establish 
something positive about God. Eunomius' contention that the 
O:y£vvn1:oc; is not privative cannot be divorced from the other 
attributes and must of necessity be applied to them too. Yet he 
refuses to acknowledge this to be the case because he wants by 
his peculiar and arbitrary distinction between this and the other 
apophatic attributes to establish his impious heresy. Indeed he 
deliberately avoids mentioA~tany other names for God 
although there are myriads of them. 
Positive and negative attributes 
Conck£'YI~_his argument in A1.10 Basil argues positively, 
that no divine attribute can be regarded as a definition of the 
divine nature or substance. Yet all these different names 
contribute, each in its own way, to the formation of some sort 
of vague concept of the totality of the divine- human nature. 
This is achieved both positively and negatively, inasmuch as the 
names attributed to God express either what tidioms' God has, or 
h I. 'd' '} h d h Th f . { 'd' ) w at 1 1oms e oes not ave. e purpose o negatmg 1 1oms 
in any attempt to form some conception of God is, as Basil 
explains, to avoid forming wrong conceptions, or thinking 
wrongly about the majesty of God. The positive idioms. are 
attributed to him, not because they offer some sort of full 
explanation of his nature, but because they are fitting to him. 
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The "ingenerate" belongs to the former category and denotes the 
fact that God does not have a "birth". This is what really 
matters and, therefore, if it is called negative, or privative, or 
whatever, this is but a matter of indifference, says Basil. By 
contrast, however, God's "substance" (ouoia) is not included 
among what are not God's properties ( oux £v 't t 'ti;>v un 
npoo6v't<UV £o'tt), because it denotes God's very being (m.no 'to 
Etvat. 'to\> 0Eou). It would be sheer madness to place God's 
being among the attributes and argue that it is identical with 
that which does not exist! That would imply the denial of all 
the divine attributes! 
The ingenerate and the divine substance 
In A1, 11 Basil discusses another contention of Eunomius 
which builds upon his previous contentions. According to this "if 
the ingenerate is neither a concept, nor a privation, nor a part 
(because God is CxuEPti<: = without parts), nor something 
different from himself, then, the ay£vvn'tov must be "an 
ingenerate substance" ( ouoia exy£vvn'to<;). This, says Basil, is 
Eunomius' ultimate aim, namely to identify the substance of God 
with the ingenerate. But he adds here something which he did 
not mention before, something, that is, which he needs in order 
to reach his ultimate conclusion. This is the claim that God is 
"without parts" ( CxuEPtic). 
Basil agrees with this claim, but he also notes that 
Eunomius wrongly distinguishes this attribute of God, i.e. 'to 
Cxj.J.Ep£<; = his being without parts, or his incompositeness, from 
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his other closely related attribute, 'to CmA.ouv = his simplicity. 
Eunomius insists on the (q.J.£ptc;;, because he wants to stress that 
God is not partly ( E:v ytv£t) aytvvn'toc;; and partly y£vvn't6c;;, or 
that 'to aytvvn'tov is something which exists inside God and is 
not God's substantial attribute. Basil finds this way of 
argumentation totally incompatible with common thinking and 
regards it as foolish by pointing to Prov. 26:4. The case is the 
exact opposite, since the aytvvn'tov can never be identified with 
God's ouoi a, because it is perceived conceptually ( Ka't · 
E:nivotav), and is privative (o't£P11'ttK6v) in its meaning. 
Eunomius' claims are quite unacceptable because they are 
unwarranted, and have not been at all substantiated. 
The definition of God's substance 
In A1,12f Basil assesses Eunomius' claim of having defined 
the substance of God. This claim, he says, is in fact a matter of 
haughtiness which surpasses that of the devil who, as Isaiah 
14:13 says, wanted "to establish his throne above the stars". It 
could not be a claim of common sense, because the human mind 
can only grasp the fact that God is (or exists, i.e. 'tO £!vat 'tov 
6£6v ), but never "what he is" ('to 't i £!vat). Nor could it be 
the teaching of the Spirit, for the great saints who were 
enlightened by the Holy Spirit, such as David (Psalm 138:6), 
Isaiah (53:8) and Paul (Rom. 11:33), claim the exact opposite, 
while Moses who spoke about creation was even unable to 
specify the substance of the earth (saying that it was without 
form and invisible) and restricted himself to simply stating the 
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fact of creation. But even the holy men of old, who were 
honoured so much by God, that he linked his name to theirs, 
being called "their God" (Hebr. 11:16), or "God of Abraham 
and God of Isaac and God of Jacob" (Ex. 3:6, 15:16), were not 
able to know the substance of God. 
It is only Eunomius, says Basil, who, nsmg above the 
Saints, Moses and the Apostles, not only claims to possess exact 
knowledge of the name and substance of God, but also dares to 
reveal it to all human beings through his writings. What he has 
actually achieved is to delude himself with the view that his 
mind has been raised above the substance of God, whereas for 
everybody else this substance is acknowledged to be beyond the 
reach of every human mind and every human knowledge. 
The unknowability of God's substance 
Continuing his discussion of the same theme in Al, 14 Basil 
teaches that knowledge of the divine substance surpasses the 
abilities not only of human beings but also of all rational 
beings, i.e. of all creatures. The Father, he says, is known only 
to the Son and to the Holy Spirit, since, as Scripture says "no 
one has known the Father save the Son" (Phil. 4:7) and "the 
Spirit searches all things, even the depths of God" (I Cor. 
2:10-11). God's substance, says Basil, is invisible to everyone, 
except to the Son and to the Spirit. Human beings, however, 
acquire some sense of God's wisdom and· goodness, when 
"through his energies they rise to him and through the created 
things form a sense of the Creator". This is "what is known of 
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God ('to yvwo'tov 'to\> 0£ou ), which God has revealed" (Rom. 
1:19) to all human beings. 
God's substance is not perceived to be something material, 
says Basil, as it happens to be the case with the atheists 
amongst the Greek sages (i.e. the naturalist Ionian philosophers, 
who put forward the dogma that matter is composite, consisting 
of four elements, fire, air, water and earth), who even thought 
that it could be composite. The immateriality of God's substance 
can also be deduced from the prophet Ezekiel's description 
according to which God is fire and amber ( cf. Ez. 8:2). But 
Basil concludes with the statement of the Apostle in Hebr. 11:6 
which indirectly prohibits speculation about the divine substance 
as it stresses one's duty to believe "that God exists and rewards 
those who seek him". 
Salvation says Basil is granted to human beings not on the 
basis of their discovering "what God is", but on the basis of 
confessing "that he is". This bejng the case, i.e. having 
established that God's substance is totally incomprehensible to 
human beings, Basil turns next to an exact investigation of the 
meaning of Eunomius' key text connected with the "ingenerate". 
The true meaning of the ingenerate 
The <Xytvvmov says Basil in A1,15 does not reveal "what 
God is", but "how he is", namely, that he is derived from no 
one, or that he is without beginning ( avapxoc;;). This is similar 
to the genealogies rn the beginning of Luke's Gospel, which do 
not say what human beings are, but whence they are derived. 
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This means that the <'xy£vvmov has nothing to do with God's 
ouoio: but with his manner of existence ('tp6Ttov \.>Ttap~E<U<;) and, 
therefore, Eunomius' contention is wrong. 
The (xy£vvrrtov, says Basil in A1,16, teaches us that God's 
life is always above and beyond our thoughts, because we 
cannot locate any principle from which it was derived. Yet 
Eunomius has employed it dialectically, contrasting it to the 
yEvvn't6v and arguing that God cannot be both. His real 
intention was to use it against the Only-begotten. Basil's 
objection to Eunomius') use of this term is two-fold. On the one 
hand he objects to Eunomius' subordination of the saving names 
of Father and Son to the names of "ingenerate" and "generate". 
On the other hand he finds totally unworthy of God, and even 
blasphemous, Eunomius' assertion that God's ingenerateness 
prevents him, or even excludes him, from any involvement in 
giving birth. Indeed this second point implies, as Basil explains 
in A1,17, that God cannot be Father at all and that there can 
be no communion between the God who cannot be Father and 
the Son who cannot have been born of him. This, however, 
stands in stark contradiction to the teachings of the Apostles, the 
Gospels and of the Lord Jesus Christ himself, as one can clearly 
see in John. 14:9 and 12:45. 
Comparison or communion of Father and Son 
If the Son does not admit of comparison or communion 
with the Father, says Basil, he would not have said that the 
former is in the latter. Since, however, the opposite is the case, 
so 
the Son has said what he has said, because it is the relative that 
reveals the relative, or the seal which bears the imprint of the 
one who imprited it, or the icon through which the archetype is 
made known. Such is the Son, says Basil in A1,18, as one can 
gather from John 6:27, and Colos. 1:15. He is a "living icon" 
( Ei Kl.>v C(;)oa) and a "self-existing life" ( mnoouoa Cc.lt'l) which 
always retains the unchangeability of the substance and not 
-a. 
something which is lifeless, or created, or A work of art and 
conceptualization. "To be in the form of God" (Phil. 2:6) is "to 
exist in God's very substance". "To have taken the form of the 
servant" (Phil. 2:7) means to have become human in substance 
and "to have been in the form of God" means to possess the 
idiom of the divine substance. This is why, says Basil, he can 
c--··· 
say "whoever has seen me, has seen the Father" (John 14:9). 
Yet Eunomius, by refusing to recognize him for what he is, 
interrupts the advance of human beings to the knowledge of 
God which is effected through him, since the Lord himself says, 
that "Whatever the Father has are the Son's also" (John 16:15) 
and, that "Just as the Father has life in himself, so he has given 
life to the Son to have it in himself" (John 5:26). 
Eunomius, however, claims that the Father has nothing to 
do with the Son as born of him and that there is no comparison 
between the one who begets and the one who is begotten. 
Through this, says Basil, Eunomius a) cancels out what is said 
about the Son as the icon (image) of the Father and b), rejects 
the statement that the Son is the radiance and character of the 
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hypostasis of God (Hebr. 1:3). 
Equality and difference of Father and Son 
In A1,19 Basil responds to Eunomius' contention that it is 
not possible to accept bot~ /that the divine substance is common 
to the Father and to the Son I and that they are differentiated as 
to order ( 't~t c;) and "seniority of time" ( xp6vou JtpeoflEi ot c;), 
the Father being first and the Son, second, because God's 
substance does not admit of time, or priority and posteriority. 
As regards the point that the Father and the Son have the 
divine substance in common, he explains that it would be totally 
unacceptable, if it was conceived of in terms of a prior 
substance which was split into Father and Son, a sort of 
ditheism. It would be acceptable, however, if it referred to one 
manner of being ( 'tov 'tou dvo:t A6yov fvo: Ko:l 'tov o:\nov £1t' 
O:wPoiv ee<Upeioeo:t ), i.e., if, for example, the Father was light 
and the Son was also light in the same way. In this case the 
common substance would not exclude the difference in the 
number and the peculiar properties of each one of them (apt e~ 
8to:q>opav umxpxet v KO:t i8t6'tnot 
Father and Son, order and seniority of time 
In Al ,20 Basil responds to the other point of Eunomius 
concerning "order" ( 't~t c;) and "seniority of time" ( 'tou xp6vou 
7tP£ofleio:). These categories, he says, are not applicable to those 
who have a common substance. This is all the more so in the 
case of the Father and the Son, who are understood in terms of 
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God and his Image, and of whom it is said that there never was 
a time when God's image was not with him (cf. Jud. 25; the 
statement in the Creed that "he is before all ages", as well as 
the designations of the Son as God's effluence and character of 
his existence, emcruya~<X K<Xt ')(<XP<XK'tllP 'tii<; \m:oo'taO£(.,)<;, Hebr. 
1:3). 
As regards the category of "order", Basil observes that it 
can be used in two ways, either naturally or conventionally 
(technically). The former refers to the order of creatures in 
accordance with their appearance at creation, or to the order in 
the series of numbers, or to the order in the relation between 
causes and effects. The latter refers to that which is constructed 
in a series of lessons, in offices, in numbers and the like. 
Eunomius, says Basil, was silent about the first and chose to 
argue only against the second, because he realized that only the 
second suited his argument. As a matter of fact, it is the first 
which is applicable to the Father and the Son, because it does 
not imply any contradiction to the fact that they share a 
common substance. 
Basil insists that there is a type of "order", which is 
identified with its natural consistency per se, as, for example, 
the order in the relation between fire and the light which is 
derived from it. In this example, says Basil, the cause comes 
first and the effect, or what is derived from it, second, without, 
however, any division between the two by way of a temporal 
distance. The priority of the cause over the effect is only in 
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thought. Consequently, when the Father is placed before the 
Son, this is done according to the type of order which pertains 
to the relation of cause and effect and not on account of some 
natural difference between them, or because of some temporal 
superiority of the one over the other. Not to do so, says Basil, 
may very well lead to the denial of God as Father, since the 
difference of substance destroys every natural conjunction. This, 
in fact, is Eunomius'choice. 
St Basil goes further in his response to Eunomius' 
contention, by conducting in At ,21 a discussion into the notion 
of time and contesting Eunomius' definition of it in terms of the 
motions of the stars. Pointing to the first days of creation, 
before the creation of the stars (Gen. 1:16), and also to the 
time when Jesus of Nun made the sun and the moon stand still, 
Basil distinguishes between the notion of time which comes with 
creation and is embedded in the life of the creatures, and the 
ways in which time is measured, to which . belongs Eunomius' 
definition. Thus he argues that days and nights are not elements 
of time, as Eunomius thinks, but ways of measuring time, while 
time is the space which is expanded along with the constitution 
of the world (xp6voc;; BE £on 'to OUIJ.1tCXP£K't£t v6~£vov 'tf.l 
ouo'tao£t 'tou K6o~ou 8tao'tn~cx). It is by this time that the 
ol 
motions of the stars, "-the animals and of any moving creature are 
measured and are said to be faster or slower in comparison with 
one another. 
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The simplicity of God's substance and John 14:28 
In Al ,22f Basil turns to the other contention of Eunomius 
which relates to the simplicity of God's substance which 
excludes the presence in it of kind ( d oo<:), or volume ( oYKo<:), 
or size (1-Ltye:eo<;;). As he explains, Eunomius stresses this point 
because he wants to combine it with the statement of John 14:28 
(that the Father is greater than the Son) and thereby exclude 
the Son from the Godhead and affirm only the One God of all 
who is ingenerate and incomparable. His real intention is to 
introduce his notion of the incompatibility between the 
ingenerate and generate substances of the Father and the Son. 
The problem with this is not only the failure to perceive that 
the substance of the Son is also simple in the same way as the 
Father's, but also in that he compares a substance which is 
without kind, volume or size, to a substance endowed with all 
these elements, i.e. an incomposite substanc~ ~o a composite 
one! Actually Eunomius connects likeness to kind (i.e. to 
external form) and equality to volume, and thus argues that the 
Father is neither equal, nor like anything else, because he is 
without kind and without volume. 
The case is, however, says Basil, that the Son too is simple 
and incomposite and, therefore, his likeness should not be 
connected with his kind but with his substance. Whatever beings 
have form and shape, their likeness is connected with kind, 
whereas the divine nature, being free from kind is formless and 
shapeless. As such it has the likeness connected with its 
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substance and the equality with the identity of power, as 
opposed to the measurement of size. As Scripture says, "Christ 
is God's power and God's wisdom" (I Cor. 1:24), because the 
Father's power has been placed on him. This is why "the Son 
does what he sees the Father doing" (John 5:19). Thus, 
Eunomius' rejection of the Son's equality with the Father can 
only be based on his deliberate decision to adopt false premises 
and, thereby, commit some sort of spiritual fornication (Jer. 
3:3). 
The true meaning of John 14:28 
Eunomius, says Basil in A1,24, tries to support his 
contention on the basis of John 14:28. He forgets, however, the 
statement of Phil. 2:6 which speaks explicitly of the Son's 
equality with the Father. It is arbitrary on his part to explain 
John 14:28 in terms of the ingenerate, i.e. as if it said that "the 
ingenerate is greater than me"! It is also arbitrary to take the 
name Father as designatory of energy rather than substance and 
to argue that the energy is greater than, or assymetric to, the 
effect produced by it, or that energy and product cannot be 
equal. 
For Basil the name Father denotes substance and on this 
basis the whole syllogism of Eunomius concerning equality or 
inequality falls to the ground. If the name Father designates 
substance, then the Father is not greater than the Son because 
every energy is symmetric to its effect, as there is no external 
obstacle. What then, is the orthodox meaning of this "greater" 
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of John 14:28? Basil explains this m the following chapter 
(A1,25). 
Basil first notes that the comparative "greater" is usually 
applied to a cause of excelling power, or superior office, or 
superior size. All these are inapplicable in the case of John 
14:28, because of the simplicity of God's substance, and because 
Father and Son are explicitly said to be "one" ( £v) in John 
10:30. "One" here means "equal or identical in power". So does 
the other statement in John 10:29 which acknowledges the 
Father to be above all and the Son to be the unfailing custodian 
of those who were delivered to him by the Father. To 
strengthen this point Basil also turns to other related verses to 
emphasize the equality of honour of the Father and the Son: Ps. 
109:1, Acts 2:34, Hebr. 8:1, 12:2, Matth. 25:31. Thus, he 
concludes that the "greater" of John 14:28, simply refers to the 
fact that the Father is the cause and principle (ai'tta Kat apxn) 
of the Son, i.e. to what the Father is as Father and not to the 
Father's substance. 
Eunomius' inconsistency 
In the final chapters of this first discourse, A1 ,26 and 27, 
Basil employs all his dialectical eloquence in order to expose the 
inconsistency of Eunomius in relation to God's peace to others 
and even to himself. This inconsistency appears in the Eunomian 
statement that all his contentions are proved by the fact that 
there is only one God who is ingenerate and incomparable (en t 
UEV £{~ 't~V O~V 0£0~ ay£vvn'to~ Kat aoUYKPt'to~). 
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How, asks Basil, can one establish that God is "greater" 
than the Son if he is incomparable? Can one compare the 
incomparable? Is this not a contradiction in terms? By what 
logic does Eunomius explain the "greater" of John 14:28 in 
·f\ot 
terms of the Father's substance and does 7 also claim that the 
/\.. 
Father is incomparable to the creatures as to his honour and 
glory, except that which is invented by himself and which 
demands of him the denigration of the Son to the level of the 
creatures and his differentiation from the Father with respect to 
substance? 
Eunomius' logic represents a new and pioneering way of 
impiety because it involves the exaltation of the Father through 
the denigration of the Son, in spite of the clear statements of 
John 5:23 ("he who does not honour the Son, does ·not honour 
the Father"), Luke 10:16 ("he who disobeys me, does not 
disobey me but the one who sent me") and John 10:30 ("I and 
the Father are one"). This is especially to be seen in Eunomius' 
attempt to expose on the one hand, the incomparability of the 
Father to the Son, and on the other hand the comparability of 
the Son to the creatures. Claiming that the Son falls short of 
the glory of the Father, like the other creatures, he establishes 
that he is equal with them and, indeed, one of them. In fact, 
says Basil, what Eunomius accomplishes by this manner of 
arguing is to please both Jews and Greeks, the former, because 
he speaks as a monotheist abou~ne and only God, and the 
latter, because he admits as a polytheist the existence of other 
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lower ·gods · , the Son and the Spirit. His fundamental error is 
that he fails to listen to the logic of the statement of John 10:30 
which unites the Son to the Father without denying the fact that 
the one is prior to the other as cause. His inconsistency lies in 
the fact that he acknowledges the Father to be incomparable, 
and yet establishes the Son's dissimilarity of substance by 
comparing the one to the other! 
(3) AN ANALYSIS OF THE SECOND ORATION 
The second Oration of St Basil's Anatre ptikos consists of 34 
chapters (to be cited as A2,1-34) and deals critically with 
Eunomius' doctrine of the Son, which amounts to an open attack 
on his Godhead and follows the blasphemies which were 
implicitly directed against the second person of the Trinity in 
the previous theological section. 
That as an offspring the Son is a creature 
A2,1 begins with a typical Christological extract from 
Eunomius' Apologetikos which accepts that the Son is one, since 
he is 1J.Ovoy£vnc;;, i.e. of a unique species, but insists that, 
according to the saints, he is "Son and offspring and creature" 
(Yioc;; Kat yE:vvn1-1a Kat noin1-1a). These names indicate that he is 
different in substance from God the Father in spite of the fact 
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that there are some who wrongly understand his birth in a 
corporeal sense. Basil regards this statement as false and 
pretentious, a sort of fighting against shadows ( aKt~c::xxia}, since 
what is claimed to be an apology has no real opponent or 
accuser, and believes that it is not worth engaging in any 
detailed examination of it. Nevertheles, he is going to proceed 
with such an examination for the sake of those who suspect that 
Eunomius cares for the truth, but will do this on the basis of 
the teachings of the Holy Spirit, i.e. the teachings of Holy 
Scripture. 
The Eunomian argument from Acts 2:36 and the Biblical basis 
In A2,2-3 Basil not only challenges Eunomius to produce 
scriptural evidence for his claim that the Son is called a 
"creature" {TtotniJ.a}, but also explains why Acts 2:36 cannot be 
used as such evidence. The £Ttot naEv of this verse refers to God 
the Father and does not imply that the Son is a Ttot niJ.Cl, for this 
kind of inference is excluded by the Holy Spirit (in __ th.e very 
text under discussion) as runfitting description of the 
Only-begotten. Dot n1-1a is used by Scripture for creatures, but 
never for the Son (e.g. Gen. 1:1, Ps. 142:5, Rom. 1:20), who is 
sometimes called figuratively "axe", or "comer-stone", or 
"stambling-stone" {Luke 3:9, Eph .• 2:20, Rom. 9:32-33). The 
statement of Acts 2:36, says Basil, does not refer to the 
substance of God the Logos who has been with God from the 
beginning, but to God the Logos "who emptied himself in 
taking to himself the form of the servant {Phil. 2:7), becoming 
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assimilated with the body of our humility (Phil. 3:21) and being 
crucified on account of weakness" (II Cor. 3:4). In other words, 
the point made here by the Apostle is not intended for the 
theology but for the economy of the divine Son. 
Eunomius is wrong to relate the £1toi no£v to the beginning 
of the Only-begotten, because the name Kupt oc;; to which the 
£1toi no£v refers does not signify substance, but authority ( ouK 
ouoic:xc;; E:o'tiv, CJAA.' E:~ouoic:xc;; ovo1J.c:x). This is clearly indicated in 
the Scriptures, as Basil promises to show later on, but 
Eunomius' misuse is deliberate and based on the "false sophistry" 
( ooq>{ OIJ.<X't t Kt138itA.~) that difference in name necessarily implies 
· difference in substance ( 't<Xi c;; 't{;)v 6VOIJ.Il'tc.lv 8t <XQ>opc:xi c;; Kc:xi. 'tftc;; 
ouo{ <XC: 1t<XP<XMCX'Yilv 0\JVEKQ><Xi V£08<Xt ). It is precisely this false 
sophistry that Basil goes on to attack in the following chapters. 
On names and on the names of Father and Son 
In A2,4 Basil argues that the names Peter and Paul do not 
imply difference of substance, but clearly refer to peculiarities 
( i8t6'tll't£<:) which characterize these particular human beings. 
Peter's name refers to his peculiar identity as son of Jonah 
(John 1:42), a man from Bethsaida (John 1:44), a brother of 
Andrew (John 1:41), ... etc., and as such it denotes his 
particular existence (hypostasis). Likewise Paul's name refers to 
his peculiar characteristics as a man from Tarsus (Acts 9:11), a 
Hebrew person (Phil. 3:5), a Pharisee according to the Law 
(ibid.), a disciple of Gamaliel (Acts 22:3), ... etc. If these names 
implied different substances then Peter and Paul should not be 
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homoousioi but heteroousioi. By the same token those who are 
called "perfect according to virtue" and, therefore, "gods" (in 
Col. 1:28 and I Cor 2:6), should be homoousioi with God and 
not heteroousioi. 
On the above basis, Basil concludes in A2,5ff, that the 
names of the Father and the Son do not denote their substances 
but their peculiarities ( i8t4J.m:a). If the opposite applied and 
Eunomius was right, then, as Basil points out, the names 
y£vvn1J.<X and noi niJ.a, which are applied to the Son, should_ 
designate the existence of two different substances in him! But 
Eunomius is not wrong only on this account. He is also wrong 
because he does not produce any Scriptural witnesses concerning 
the attribution of the term noi niJ.a to the Son and, also, 
I;· 
allegedly argues against those who understand the Son's 
generation in a corporeal sense, even though such a view is 
nowhere to be found in the Holy Scriptures. 
On the names offspring ( ytwn~J.<X) and creature ( 1t0i tUJa) 
The fact is, however, as Basil explains in A2,6, that 
Eunomius pretentiously attempts to drive out this last error in 
order to cover up another, namely, his alleged attribution of the 
term noi niJ.a to the Son by the Saints. What he fails to 
understand is that the true understanding of the birth of the Son 
implies identity of substance between the begotten one and his 
begettor, which drives out Eunomius' view o the Son as 
noi niJ.<X. Eunomius, says Basil, is aware of this contradiction, and 
thus attempts to overcome it by insisting that he takes the 
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scriptural term ytvvn~J.a as denoting the hypostasis and the 
substance of the Son. What he does now in the case of the Son 
is not any different from what he did earlier in the case of the 
Father. Just as previously he identified the ingenerate with the 
Father's substance, so now he identifies the generate with the 
substance of the Son, so that he may establish his dogma of the 
difference in substance between the two. He forgets, however, 
that neither the ingenerate nor the generate are terms which the 
Spirit used in the Scriptures. 
Scripture, Basil points out in A2, 7, does say that the Father 
gave birth to the Son, but does not call him y£vvniJ.<X, although 
he is called "angel of great counsel" {Is. 9:6) and "Christ the 
Son of God" (Matth. 16:16). Basil insists that one cannot change 
the names given in the Scriptures because they have distinctive 
connotations. He clearly demonstrates this in A2,8 by referring 
to many cases in the Scriptures (e.g. Ps. 2:7, Matth. 21:28, Gen. 
22:8, Prov. 3:11, 10:1) where to give birth to a being which is 
endowed with a soul is never linked with the word ytvvn!J.<X but 
with the words "t£Kvov or ui6c;. On the contrary ytvvniJ.a is used 
to denote an embryo which is aborted before it is formed, while 
Scripture explicitly uses this term (y£vvn1J.a) to denote fruits of 
the earth, or offspring of animals (Matth. 26:29 and Matth. 
23:33). It is the case, then, that neither in common, nor in 
scriptural usage is the term y£vvn1J.a used as Eunomius uses it. 
In A2,9 Basil turns to an examination of the term ytvvn~J.a 
itself in order to assess Eunomius' claim that this name reveals 
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the very substance of the Son. He distinguishes two kinds of 
terms, those that are absolute and refer to things in themselves 
( 'tCx CmOAEA~EVCU<;; KCxi. K<X8 1 E<X\J'tCx TtpO(j)Ep61J.EV<X 'tQV UTtOKEtiJ.EVCUV 
<XU'toi c;; Ttpay~.ul'tcuv oniJ.<XV't t Ka) and those that refer to their 
relations tO Other things ( 'tCx TtPO<;; E'tEP<X AEY61J.EV<X 'tl'IV OJCEOt V 
E:~J.qJ<Xt vov'ta 'ti'IV Ttpoc;; a A.£yE't<Xt ). So, he mentions the terms 
man, ox, horse, as examples of the former and the terms son, 
servant, friend, as examples of the latter. Thus he contends that 
he who hears the term y£vvn1J.<X does not think of a substance 
but of a relation between the thing in discussion and something 
else. This is clearly to be seen in the fact that this term never 
stands on its own but is always a complement of something else. 
Whenever something is said to be y£vvn1J.<X it is always said to 
be such in relation to something else. Indeed even the absolute 
names, says Basil, do not refer to the substance of things but to 
the things themselves as denoted by one or more peculiarities of 
their substance. 
In A2,10 Basil produces a rhetorical argument which 
constitutes aVJ inversion of Eunomius' contention, in order 
to expose the absurdity of it. If, he says, every y£vvniJ.<X denotes 
substance, then all of them must be consubstantial to each other 
and, consequently, the Creator should have the same substance 
with whatever was created. This, however, stands in direct 
contradiction to Eunomius' unique understanding of the Son as 
y£vvn1J.<X. Thus the only way left to Eunomius to avoid this 
contradiction, says Basil, is to accept that y£vvn1J.<X does not refer 
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to the substance of the begotten but to his relation to the one 
who begat him. In this case to consider the Son as y£vvn1J.o: 
along with other beings does not demean the divine substance of 
the Son which is eternal and immortal in contrast to the other 
yEvvn·ux . To fail to distinguish ouoio: and y£vvn1J.o:, says Basil, is 
ultimately to accept that the y£vvrn..to: is the substance of the 
UyEVVll'tOV. 
Divine generation in relation to existence and non-existence 
In A2,11 Basil proceeds further into Eunomius' doctrine of 
the Son. Eunomius' teaching on the y£vvn1J.o: is only the prelude 
to what he wants to assert. This emerges now with Eunomius 
sophistic argument that 
"the Son's substance did not exist before it was formed and 
that it was born before all things by the will of the 
Father". 
Basil exposes not only the real intention of Eunomius in 
propounding this sophistry, namely, the belief that the Son was 
born out of nothing, but also his fallacy_ in _this-claim __ which 
consists of two things: that he first compares the Son's substance 
with itself, and second, that he subordinates it to the category 
of time attempting to understand the meaning of what is 
temporally prior on the basis of this comparison! If Eunomius' 
"before" ( np6 ), says Basil, is a temporal reference to the 
substance of the Son, then, the Son must have been born "out 
of nothing". This implies, however, two obvious errors: a) that 
the Creator of the ages is posterior to time and the ages, 
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although Holy Scripture recognizes him to be anterior to the 
ages (cf. I Cor. 2:7, Col. 1:26 and Hebr. 1:2); and b) that the 
Father was not Father from the beginning, but became Father 
later on! Basil discusses this last point in A2,12, beginning with 
St Athanasius' contention, that if to be Father is good and 
fitting for God, then not to have been always Father is bad and 
unfitting. Basil teaches that God "has been Father from all 
infinity and has never began to be Father" ( £~ cbtEi pou E:o't l 
llcnnp, ouK ap~Cq.J.Ev6c;; lto'tE 'to\J Efvcn llcnnp). His eternity is on 
a par with his paternity. Consequently the Son always existed 
along with the Father and never begl.\n to be Son. Paternity and 
Sonship go hand in hand, the only difference being that the 
former is the beginning ( apxn) of the latter, not as preceding 
temporally but ~b_eing_ "cause" ( cxi 't i ex). If one can show that 
the communion of Father and Son is eternal and there is 
nothing that can interfere between them, then Eunomius' 
blasphemy becomes apparent, because it amounts to the belief 
that the Son came out of nothing. 
Divine generation in relation to time 
In A2, 13 Basil explains why Eunomius' contention 
concerning the Son's derivation out of nothing implies the 
priority of time over both the Son and the Father. To compare 
the Father to the Son temporally, as Eunomius does, is, says 
Basil, to introduce time between Father and Son and, worse 
still, to measure both of them, or their relation to each other, 
by temporal measure. But then, how does Scripture teach that 
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he created the ages (Hebr. 1:2) and that all things were made 
through him (John 1:3), including, of course, the ages? What is 
the space, asks Basil, which is implied by the phrase "before the 
substance of the Son was created", if there is nothing that was 
not created through him? 
It is obvious that on the evidence of the statements of Holy 
Scripture there has never been, nor will there ever be any 
notion which is older than the hypostasis of the Only-begotten. 
Thus the existence of God the Logos, who "was in the 
beginning towards God" (John 1:2), is beyond anything that can 
be conceived. Even if our mind, says Basil, is deceived through 
its endless imaginations, recreating through thought non-existing 
realities, it will never be able to surpass the beginning of the 
Only-begotten and see "empty ages" of the God of the ages 
Basil further exposes Eunomius' subtlety in A2,14 as he 
argues that the latter's exaltation of the Son through 
n~~U 
acknowledging his priority over all the creatures is vain, once he A 
robbed him of his real divine glory by alienating him from 
communion with the Father as far as he could. But there are 
further sophistries in Eunomius armoury which Basil does not 
shrink from taking up. 
Further Eunomian arguments on generation and existence 
Eunomius asks "whether God gave birth to a Son who 
existed, or to a Son who did not exist?" If the latter is the 
case, then no one could accuse him of impiety. If, on the other 
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hand, he did exist, then this teaching is both absurd, 
blasphemous and exceedingly stupid, because whoever exists 
does not need to be born. Basil explains that this old Arian 
argument implies in fact what Eunomius criticised earlier, 
namely the use of a corporeal understanding of birth. It is with 
reference to the birth of animals, says Basil, that one can say 
that the animals which were born did not exist before they were 
born. That this logic is inapplicable to the case of the Son can 
be seen from the opening statement of the Gospel of St John, 
"that the Logos was in the beginning and the Logos was towards 
God and the Logos was God" (John 1:1). Here the term 
"beginning" is absolute and without implying any relation 
because it refers to the highest nature. This absolute status is 
extended to the word "was" (nv), which does not imply some 
beginning in time, as in the cases of Job 1:1, or I Kings 1:1, or 
Gen. 1:2, but has the same import as the word "who is" (Qv), 
as in Rev. 1:8. Both the "who is" and the "who was" denote 
what is eternal and timeless. Thus, to hold that the "one who is 
from the beginning" is "out of non-being" is to reject the 
meaning of "beginning" and to refuse to connect it with the 
existence of the only-begotten. But according to the teaching of 
Scripture, it is impossible to think of anything which is older 
than the beginning, as it is impossible to separate the beginning 
from God the Logos. 
In A2, 15 Basil elaborates the teaching of the Gospels on the 
Son. Matthew speaks of his birth according to the flesh, since it 
68 
is a book dealing with the "generation of Jesus Christ, son of 
David" (Matth. 1:1). Mark begins with the kerygma of John the 
Baptist concerning him (Mark 1:1). Luke begins with the 
corporeal things and rises to the heights of theology. It is John 
who raised himself above everything that falls captive to the 
senses, including time which is connected with such sensible 
things. He has given a knowledge of Christ which is best 
described by Paul {in II Cor. 5:16) as going beyond the 
knowledge which is according to the flesh {Kcx'ta o6:pKcx). By 
going beyond the beginning of Mary and the beginning of time 
and by introducing the ultimate beginning of all beginnings John 
clearly taught the eternal existence of the Logos, his impassible 
birth, his co-existence with the Father, the majesty of his nature 
and everything connected with him in a matter of a few 
syllables! He used the "was" ('to nv) in such a way that he 
excluded the "was not" ('to ouK nv ), since he united the "was" 
with the beginning and, thus, the birth of the Only-begotten 
with the eternity of the Father. And all this exalted theology 
was sealed with his teaching about this Son as the Life and 
Light of the world. It is in this light, says Basil, that one can 
assess the magnitude of the blasphemy of the Eunomian claim 
that he "was not in the beginning" ('tO EV apxf.J OUK nv) which 
stands in stark contradiction to the Gospel. 
The ·meaning of the Son as God's Image 
In A2, 16 Basil elaborates his assessment of the Eunomian 
blasphemy against the Only-begotten. This blasphemy is derived 
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he says from a mind which resembles the eye of a blind person, 
a mind which is deprived of the light of the Only-begotten and 
has, therefore, fallen into the snares of arbitrary imagination. 
Eunomius has fallen from the theological stance of the 
Scriptures which is presented in the statement, "In Thy Light we 
shall see Light" (Ps. 35:9), which has a direct reference to the 
Logos, since he is the Light of God who enlightens the world 
(John 1:9). The truth of the Son's generation cannot be 
measured with corporeal senses, because it is "without passion, 
without separation, without division, and without time". 
The Son is "the Icon (Image) of the invisible God" (Col. 
1:15), not as a mere picture of art, later constructed according 
to some preexisting archetype, but as a living icon co-existing 
with the prototype, since the entire nature of the Father was 
entirely imprinted upon the entire Son. This type of imprint 
excludes the mediation of time even within the movements of 
the mind. 
Continuing his _expostulations on the same theme of the Son 
as God's Icon in A2,17 Bas.il says that this is a "generated icon" 
( Ei KQV yEvvmn) in the sense of being "effluence of the glory of 
God" (Hebr. 1:3), or "wisdom and power of God" (I Cor 1:24), 
or "righteousness of God" (I Cor 1:30); and this is not as 
custom or convention ( £~t c, or E:m 1n8n 61nc), but as "living 
and active substance" ( ouoio: (woo: Ko:i i:vEpY'Iic;). The Son is for 
Basil "the effluence of the glory of the Father", because he 
shines forth the entire glory of the Father in himself" ( cf. Jn. 
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14:8). 
Thus Basil can put forth the statement, "He was because he 
was born" as the truth against the lie of Eunomius' sophistry, 
according to which, "if he was, he was not born". In the 
teaching of the Scriptures the Son's existence, explains Basil, is 
not ingenerate, yet he was always coexisting with the Father 
who is the cause of his existence. Otherwise, one would have to 
affirm that God the Father could have glory without effluence, 
or could be deprived of wisdom or power, etc. Thus the 
generation of the Son is eternally conjoined to the ingenerate-
ness of the Father. This, says Basil, is the clear teaching of the 
Spirit which one gathers when he puts together the nv of John 
1:1 and the £y£vvna6: oe: of Ps. 109:3, which refer respectively 
to the Son's timeless and pre-eternal existence and to the cause 
of it. 
In this light Eunomius' argument, that "if the Son 
pre-existed his birth should have been ingenerate", is an absurd 
and non-existing construction of his imagination, or else it is 
linked to the notion of ages which exist before the Son and 
which is impossible for the Scriptures. Thus it is as absurd to 
enquire about what existed before the generation of one who 
has always been with the Father as it is to enquire about what 
was prior to the ingenerate and beginningless. Such an enquiry 
is not different from asking, a) what will there be after the 
death of the deathless? or b) what was there before the 
generation of the eternal? 
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The heart of the problem of Eunomian reasoning, explains 
Basil, is the false identification of the ingenerate with the 
eternal. The fault consists in the misundertanding of their 
meanings. Ingenerate means without beginning or cause of 
existence. Eternal means older than any kind of time and age. 
The case of the Son demonstrates that ingenerate and eternal 
are not identical because he is generate, having the Father as his 
beginning and cause, and eternal because he was before all time 
and every age. Thus, concludes Basil, just as it is absurd to 
attribute eternity to creation, so it is absurd to deprive the 
Master of all creation from eternal status. 
The Eunomian ingenerate and generation 
In A2,18 Basil discusses another Christological argument of 
Eunomius which is again designed to denigrate the Son. If, says 
Eunomius, the Father's substance is ingenerate, then it does not 
admit of generation, and if the generation of the Son is not 
from a pre-existing substance, he must have been born from the 
Father having had no existence previously. Basil's response is 
quite vehement, because he calls Eunomius an atheist! This is 
due to his understanding of the Son as "the one who really is" 
( o ov'tQc; IJJv ), who gives being to all creation and has revealed 
himself to be such to the saints. He elaborates and defends this 
with a whole barrage of evidences from Holy Scripture: Ex. 
3:14, 3:2, 3:6, 3:14, Is. 9:6, Gen. 3:11, 31:13, 28:13 Ps. 2:7 and 
John 1:2. At the same time he lists several other scriptural 
evidences in the first part of A2, 19 and applies them to 
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Eunomius in order to expose him and prove that he stands 
condemned as a follower of one who has not b~i!!g _ill ways in 
existence but has come out of nothing (Ps. 52:2, Gal. 4:8, Jerm. 
5:7, Esther 4:17, I Cor. 1:28). 
In the second part of A2,19 Basil exposes Eunomius' 
attempt to present the Son as a created being above all other 
created beings on the grounds that he is their Creator. This 
alleged superiority of the substance of the Son over that of 
creatures which were brought into being out of nothing by him, 
says Basil, is only a pretext for covering up the creaturehood of 
the Son. Given the examples which Eunomius uses to explain 
this superiority (it is like that of the potter over the clay, or 
that of the shipbuilder over the wood), it is clear that, 
ultimately, the difference of substance between the Son and all 
other creatures amounts to nothing, for as Basil says, the Son 
does not cease to share with all creatures in the fact of having 
been created. 
The Eunomian understanding of the term Only-begotten 
In A2,20 Basil attacks another pretentious Christological 
argument of Eunomius which is connected with his distortion of 
the meaning of the term Only-begotten. For Eunomius this term 
means that he alone became the most perfect minister of the 
Ingenerate God, having been born and created of him through 
his power. This meaning, says Basil, is contrary to both 
/ 
common and scriptural usage and is deliberately propounded by 
Eunomius who wants to show that the Lord is God's Son like 
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the rest in the sense of Is. 1:2, Ex. 4:22, Phil. 2:9. What, 
however, he uses above all is Prob. 8:22ff, which constitutes 
Eunomius fundamental exegetical basis. Basil supplies three 
reasons against this basis: a) that it appears only once; that the 
book of Proverbs is full of obscure or hidden meanings and 
riddles; and 3) that other translators who understood better the 
original Hebrew text use the term £K,;floa'to instead of EK'tto£v, 
which, as Gen. 4:1 shows, means E:y£vvno£v. 
Basil produces further arguments against Eunomius' 
understanding of the t.J.ovoy£vil<; in A2,21. If, as Eunomius says, 
Only-begotten is used for one who is born of another alone (in 
this case of the Son from the Father alone), then this term 
should be banned from human usage because human beings are 
born of two parents and not of one. The fact is, however, that 
in ordinary usage only-begotten denotes one who is unique 
because he has no brothers. If Eunomius is right, then, even 
creation must be only-begotten, and everything in it, because, 
according to him, everything was created by the Son alone. This 
is in fact suggested by the Eunomian description of the Son as 
"the most perfect minister of God". But this contradicts, says 
Basil, the scriptural reference to other ministering spirits. The 
point is, however, that Eunomius wants to interpret the term 
"only-begotten" in such a way that it implies "one who is 
created". 
The Eunomian usage of the names Father and Son 
It is this same point that Eunomius wants to establish, says 
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Basil in A2,22, when he proceeds to admonish his readers that 
one should not take the names of Father and Son literally, lest 
he falls into the error of introducing anthropomorphic 
participation and passions into God. As far as his denial of 
participation (llE'touoia) is concerned, Basil explains that it is 
intended to establish the point that the substance of the Son is 
different from that of the Father. It is for this same reason that 
Eunomius also radically distinguishes the meanings of the names 
which are different to each other. But the terms of Father and 
Son, says Basil, are the most distinctive dogma of the Gospel on 
which the Jews and Greeks stumbled and fell. Christians, 
however, seal their faith in Father and Son, rather than Creator 
and creature, through their baptism. To say that the Father is 
not really Father and that the Son is not really Son, says Basil, 
is to annul the power of the Gospels. The opposite, however, is 
the case, for the names of Father and Son are not only real but 
denote the relation which pertains between them. Father is one 
who gives beginning of existence to another by a way which is 
akin to his nature. Son is one who receives beginning of 
existence from another by way of birth. 
In A2,23 Basil responds to the Eunomian claim that the 
terms Father and Son imply passions. Such an anthropomorphic 
imposition, says Basil, is inapplicable to the divine nature, which 
is immutable and unchangeable. It is an: imals that give birth 
with passion and it is quite impossible to think of a similar 
process in God. This, however, does not exclude a notion of 
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birth which is appropriate to God's nature. Such a notion 1s in 
fact suggested by the very names of Father and Son which, in 
the light of what the Lord says in Matth. 23:9, cannot be taken 
as conventional. Nevertheless Basil admits that there is 
~ 
[Conventional use of these names in Scripture, when it comes to 
describing the relation of God to creatures. Such a usage is 
suggested in Job 38:28, where God is said to be father of (lit. 
to have given birth to) "drops of dew". The point that Basil 
wants to make is that the sons by ,q J.., ption cannot be used 
for denying the Son by nature and far less the true Father. God 
is Father of the Son by nature and Father of us by convention, 
or by grace. Thus Eunomius is utterly pretentious in denying 
passionate birth in God, because he does it in order to deny to 
God every kind of birth, including the natural one of his 
Only-begotten Son. That the names Father and Son and even 
- t 
Only-begotten can be used conventionally, says Basil, without 
however implying a rejection of their real use, is clearly shown 
in the Holy Scriptures: Rom. 8:29, Mark 3:31-35. 
In A2,24 Basil points out that the metaphorical language of 
Holy Scripture, which speaks of God as getting angry, sleeping, 
flying, etc., does not cancel the expressions of the Holy Spirit, 
nor is it understood corporeally. Thus when one encounters 
words relating to birth in God, one should try to understand 
them as it is fitting to him. One should not proscribe and 
accuse- only these words, when he knows that there are 
countless others which are also applied to God even though they 
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emerge out of human experience. Actually, says Basil, the 
notion of birth has in Scripture two meanings: a) the passion of 
the one who begets and b) the relation of the "Q~gettor to the 
begotten. Whenever it is connected with God the Father, as in 
Ps. 2:7 and 109:3, it obviously carries the second meaning, not 
only because there is no passion in God, but also because this 
birth is inexplicable and incomprehensi~. To attempt to explain 
it away in order to accept it is to employ the method of the 
pagans who followed what seemed to them reasonable and 
disobeyed the kerygma of the Spirit. 
Basil returns in the same chapter to the earlier Eunomian 
point which sees the Son as a creature but different from, or 
prior to, the other creatures. He objects to it using Eunomius' 
own principle, namely, that different names imply different 
substances. If that principle is correct, he says, then the opposite 
must be the case: i.e., identical names should imply identity of 
substance. But then, how could the Son be creature and yet 
different from all other creatures? It is obvious that Eunomius 
uses or reverses his principles in accordance with the 
circumstances so that he may establish only his preconceived 
points of view. 
The Nicene Ught from Light ... and the Eunomian 
ingenerate/ generate 
In A2,25 Basil contrasts Eunomius' point of view to that of 
the Fathers at Nicaea saying that the former employs sophistic 
arguments in order to defend his opposition to the latter. Nicaea 
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spoke of Father and Son as divine lights, or light from light, 
affirming at the same time that the divine light is one. 
Eunomius separates the Father as light from the Son as light 
using the constrast or difference between the ingenerate and the 
generate. He does exactly the same with the related notions of 
life and power. 
Responding to the above in A2,26f, Basil insists that the 
true difference is not between light and light, or life and life, 
or power and power, but between light and darkness, life and 
death, power and impotence, and, therefore, Eunomius' claim is 
false. Nor could Eunomius take the Nicene language of light 
from light, or life from life, or power from power, and 
subordinate it to his contrast between ingenerate and generate, 
because the language of light, life and power is borrowed from 
the Holy Scriptures. The Son is called "true light" in John 1:9, 
"life" in John 16:6, and "God's power" in I Cor. 1:24. If such 
terms, says Basil, cannot be contrasted to themselves, then, 
Eunomius' attempt to do so represents but a crafty ploy which 
is founded only on sophistic syllogisms. 
The presupposition which governs his entire argumentation 
is his view that the substance of the Father is different from the 
substance of the Son. This is what makes him propound a 
radical difference between ingenerate and generate, and makes 
him subordinate to it the notions of light, life, power and 
everything else that is attributed to Father and Son, including 
these very names. By contrast, says Basil, the presupposition of 
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the orthodox faith is that, from a good Father a good Son has 
been derived, from an ingenerate light an eternal light has 
shown forth, from the true life a life-giving source has been 
supplied and from the self-sufficient power a power of God has 
been revealed. As regards darkness, death and impotence, these 
are characteristics of "the leader of this world" (John 12:31), of 
the "world rulers of darkness" (Eph. 6:12), of "the spiritual 
hosts of wickedness" (ibid.) of the entire power which is hostile 
to God. None of these, says Basil, has its antithesis to what is 
good as a characteristic of their substance. They are such in the 
sense that they turned to evil, having lost the good by their 
own will. It is impossible, says Basil, to agree with Eunomius in 
placing the Only-begotten with these. 
The true understanding of ingenerate and generate 
In A2,28 Basil interprets his understanding of the terms 
"ingenerate" and "generate" in contrast to that of Eunomius. For 
him the difference between them is not one of greater to lesser, 
but one which pertains exactly to what separates two incom-
patibles. Nor is it right that something which is what it is by 
nature may be later changed into something opposite, i.e. the 
generate to become ingenerate and vice versa. For Eunomius, 
however, the difference is one of degree, as that which 
distinguishes the light itself from its image which is deemer and 
lesser in intensity. In Basil's view, then, a substance cannot be 
contrary to another substance in whatever context of being. 
This, says Basil, is also acknowledged by the secular philo-
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sophers, whom, in this case, the Eunomians deride, simply 
because they do not agree with their argument. 
According to Basil "ingenerate" and "generate" are cognitive 
ridioms> or properties (yv(.&)a'ttKcd i8t6'tll'te:<;), considered to be in 
the divine sustance and helping us to understand that the Father 
and the Son cannot be confused. They are attributed to the 
substance as some sort of "characteristics or forms" (xapaK'ti;p£<; 
't 1. ve:<; Kat IJ.Opc:pcxi) which differentiate what is common by means 
of peculiar characteristics ( i 81. 6:(ouat xapaK'ti;pat) without, 
however, interrupting the homogeneity of the substance. Thus 
the Godhead denotes the common ( Kot vn) substance, whereas 
Fatherhood and Sonship are peculiar properties ( i 81. 4..la'ta ). It is 
by combining what is common ('to Kot v6v) and what is peculiar 
('to f8tov) that we come to understand the truth. When we hear 
about "ingenerate light" we should think of the Father, and 
when we hear about "generate light" we should think of the 
Son. Inasmuch as Father and Son are light and light, there is no 
contrast between them. Inasmuch as one is ingenerate and the 
other generate they are contrasted to each other. The contrast 
reveals the different idioms of their existence, but the unity of 
substance is not broken. 
In A2,29 Basil clarifies further his distinction between what 
is common and what is peculiar by elaborating his objections to 
Eunomius' contentions. For Eunomius, he says, the light could 
not be any different from the ingenerate, for otherwise God 
would be composite. On this basis he transfers to the substance 
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the difference which is applicable to the idioms (properties). 
Basil responds that the ingenerate is not part of God's substance 
and therefore the charge of a composite God is false. The 
ingenerate and the generate, he says, are "cognitive idioms" 
(yvc.>O'ttKcd i5t6'tnuc;). But the names of light, life, goodness, 
etc., are indicative manners of the peculiarity of divine substance 
(5£tK'ttKoi. 'tiiC: i5t6'tT'I'tOC: mnou 'tp6not} which do not destroy 
its simplicity. This is especially to be seen in I Tim. 6:16 and 
Ps. 103:2, where "light" is connected with the substance of God 
and not with the ingenerate, because it is in the former and not 
in the latter that God is said to dwell. 
The real difference of Father and Son 
In A2,30 Basil responds to another related argument of 
Eunomius which is, as he says, so designed as to push the Son 
as far away from the Father as possible. Eunomius says that 
"The substance of God is above his kingdom and entirely 
exclusive of generation ... and thus, by virtue of the law of 
nature, it pushes away any comparison of itself with 
anything else (i.e. the Son)". 
Basil finds this syllogism. quite unacceptable because, in the last 
analysis, it deprives God of his freedom and restricts him to 
limits or laws of necessity, since it subjects him to the law of 
nature. The contrast between nature and freedom is applicable 
here inasmuch as Eunomius uses the example of fire to illustrate 
his theological point. The case of God's substance, being 
ingenerate and excluding generation, is similar to the case of 
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fire which has by nature, rather than by choice or will, the 
property of heating and excludes coldness. Thus Eunomius wants 
God's substance to be totally alien to the Son by virtue of the 
necessary laws of nature. 
In A2,31 Basil points out that Eunomius uses his above 
argument to reject the so-called semi-Arians who argued that the 
Only-begotten is like in substance with the Father ( 6~-tot ov •f.! 
ouoi~ 1:<;} llo:'tpt). Eunomius' problem with the Homoioousians 
was that 
"they dare to compare the unruled substance ( a8£ono1:ov 
ouoio:v), which is above all cause and free from every law, 
with the substance which is generate and subject to the laws 
of the Father, as if they have never considered the 
substance of creatures, or cannot think about existing things 
with a clear mind." 
Basil argues that it is Eunomius who contradicts himself, 
inasmuch as he wants on the one hand the substance of the 
Father to be unruled, above all cause and absolutely free, and 
yet to be subjected to the law of its own nature, and on the 
other hand, he wants the Son's substance to be servile and 
subject to the laws of the Father, although he has the 
characteristics of lordship and ruling authority. The fact is, says 
Basil, that the Son is servile to the Father's laws according to 
Phil. 2:8, not because he has a lower substance, but because he 
condescended to become such for the sake of humanity, even 
though he was King and Lord. Furthermore Eunomius further 
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contradicts himself by placing the Son beyond any comparison 
with the Father with respect to substance, inasmuch as he admits 
that the energy of the Father's substance is in accordance with 
his dignity (i.e. his ingenerateness), but fails to see that the 
Only-begotten, who is called by him, God's energy or icon of 
God's energy, should also be in accordance with God's dignity, 
i.e. his substance, or (in Eunomius' view) his ingenerateness! 
Do the different operations of the Trinity imply different 
substances? 
In A2,32 Basil critically assesses Eunomius' other related 
contention: that 
"if one is to proceed from the created beings to substances 
and if one considers that differences in energy imply 
difference in substance, the fact that the ingenerate God 
created the Only-begotten and the Only-begotten created the 
Paraclete, should imply that the substances of the Father the 
Only-begotten and the Paraclete are different". 
For Basil this procedure from created beings to substances is 
wrong, because created beings indicate the power, wisdom and 
artistry of the Creator and not his substance. Besides, they may 
not indicate the entire creative power of the Creator, because it 
is possible for a Creator to use only part of his creative power. 
Even if the Creator, says Basil, were to reveal all his power in 
the creation of a created being, he would still have revealed 
only his power and not his substance. But here, says Basil, 
Eunomius focuses on the simplicity and incompositeness of the 
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divine substance so that he can identify, as he thinks, substance 
and power and; thus) using the difference in power of the three 
persons in creating one another, he might differentiate their 
substances and argue that the one is greater than the other. 
The real problem in this case, as Basil points out, is 
Eunomius' inconsistency, for here he identifies substance and 
power, whereas earlier he asserted that power is unlike 
• 
substance. In any case for St Basil) whereas in the case of an 
artist his substance is not known from his works, in the case of 
a begettor his substance is known from the nature of his 
offspring. Thus if the Only-begotten were a creature of the 
Father, he would not have revealed the Father's substance. If, 
however, he makes the Father known through himself, he 
cannot be a creature, but a true Son and Image of God and 
"character of his existence (hypostasis)" (Hebr. 1:3). 
The Spirit as the Son's creation 
In the final chapters A2,33-34 of this second Oration St 
Basil takes up Eunomius' Pneumatology as it emerges from his 
above contentions and prepares the way for the third Oration 
which is totally dedicated to the doctrine of the Holy Spirit. 
Ignoring Matth. 12:31 (the blasphemy against the Spirit), 
Eunomius, says Basil, asserts that the Holy Spirit is a creature, 
almost suggesting that it is lifeless, since the name "spirit" is 
applied to inanimate objects. He previously did the same with 
the Son, when he asserted that he was a creature of the 
Ingenerate. By treating the Spirit as a creature which did not 
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exist Eunomius attempts to prove the lower status of the 
Only-begotten. Although the heavens declare the glory of God 
(Ps. 18:2), for Eunomius the Holy Spirit declares the diminution 
of the glory of God. Even though the Lord said about the 
Paraclete that "He would glorify him" (John 16:14), Eunomius 
insists that the Spirit is an obstacle when it comes to comparing 
the Son to the Father, since he does not suggest any special 
honour for his Creator. For Basil, however, there is no energy 
of the Son which is separated from the Father, just as there is 
no characteristic of the Son which is alien to the Father, 
because, as the Lord says, "all that is yours [the Father's] is 
mine [the Son's]" (Lk 15:31 and John 17:10). Eunomius, says 
Basil, alienates the Spirit from the Father and deliberately 
connects his origin with the Son so that he can diminish the 
glory of the Only-begotten. Does he forget that the two 
different origins of Marcion and Manichaios led to their 
downfall? or that there is only one origin in God, who is the 
cause of all, although it is acknowledged that everything is made 
through the Logos? The NT clearly declares that the Spirit is 
connected both with the Son ( Rom. 8:9) and the Father (I Cor. 
2:12), and that he is the Spirit of Truth (John 15:26), i.e. of the 
Son, who proceeds from the Father. 
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(4) AN ANALYSIS OF THE THIRD ORATION 
The third and shortest ifration of Basil's Anatreptikos 
consists of 7 chapters (A3,1-7) and is dedicated to a critical 
discussion of Eunomius' doctrine of the Spirit, according to 
which ,'in the teaching of the saint~ the Spirit is third not only in 
order and dignity but in nature and substance as well. 
In A3,1 Basil discusses Eunomius' claim that in his 
Pneumatology he does not follow the views of the many but of 
the saints. In condemning the many he resembles the 
philosophers who elevate themselves above the many, and in 
claiming the saints he is devious because he does not mention 
them. For Basil the truth is that as the Son is second in order 
('tij 't~Et) and dignity ( 't4? ~tci!IJ.O:'tt) in comparison to the 
Father, as having the Father as his beginning and cause, but is 
not second with respect to substance, likewise the Holy Spirit ts 
not third in substance, because he is third in order and dignity. 
Does difference in order and dignity imply difference in 
substance? 
In A3,2 Basil employs the example of the angels, who 
differ in dignity, since some are protectors of nations ( cf. Deut. 
32:8, Dan. 10:13 and 10:20) and others of believers (Matth. 
18:10), but share the same name and the same nature, to argue 
that something parallel applies to the Holy Spirit. There is no 
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explicit statement anywhere, he says, stating that the Spirit is 
third in nature. Nor could one classify the Spirit with the lower 
nature of creatures, which is servile, and admits of sanctification 
or acquisition of virtue, because the Spirit sanctifies (II Thess. 
2:13) and is by nature good (Ps. 142:10). Nor could one include 
the Spirit among the ministering spirits of the angels which are 
mentioned in Hebr. 1:14, because the Spirit is hegemonic (Ps. 
50:14) and is not enumerated with the creatures, but with the 
Trinity (Matth. 28:19). Unlike the principalities and the powers 
who admit of sanctification, the Spirit is holy by nature ( Jn 
14:26) and supplies sanctification to everything else, being 
himself "source of sanctification" (II Mace. 14:36). It is, 
l 
therefore, "\Vho~ unacceptable to count the Spirit among the 
creatures. 
The biblical names of the Spirit show him to be God 
In A3,3 Basil continues his argument for the true Godhead 
of the Spirit by citing relevant biblical evidenc~ 1 pertaining to 
the names of the Spirit. Such names are common to the Spirit 
and to God, the Father and the Son. 
The Spirit is holy as the Father and the Son are holy, 
according to Isaiah who bears witness to this through his vision 
of the thrice holy hymn of the Seraphim (Is. 6:3). What lies 
behind this is the one sanctification which is naturally supplied 
by the Holy Trinity. · 
Not only the name "holy" but also the name "spirit" is 
shared by the Trinity, says Basil, since "God is spirit and those 
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who worship him should worship him in spirit and in truth" 
(John 4:24}, or "Spirit before us is Christ the Lord .. " (Lament. 
of Jer. 4:20), or "The Lord is the Spirit" (II Cor. 3:17}. 
Far from indicating difference of substance, the use of these 
names demonstrates the congeniality of the Spirit tow~(is the 
Father and the Son. Besides, God is called good (Lk 18:18-19) 
and the same applies to the Holy Spirit (Ps. 142:10). At the 
same time the glory of the Spirit is not different from the glory 
of the Son if he is called another Paraclete besides the Son 
(John 14:16). 
The energies of the Spirit show his Godhead 
In A3,4 Basil attempts to show the Godhead of the Spirit 
from the kind of energies that issue from him. Referring to Ps. 
32:6 he says that the Spirit supplies to the heavenly powers the 
concreteness and firmness of their virtue. He also points to the 
verse from Job which states, that "the Spirit of the Lord is the 
one who made me" (Job 33:4), and claims that this refers not to 
Job's creation but to his perfection in virtue. Isaiah, speaking on 
behalf of the Lord about his incarnation, states: "the Lord has 
sent me and his Spirit" (Isaiah 48:16); and the Psalmist, wishing 
to reveal that the power of the Spirit fills all things, states: 
"Where shall I go from your Spirit? and where shall I flee from 
your presence" (Ps. 138:7)? 
Basil also refers to the energies of the Spirit which are 
granted to human beings and to their magnificence. The Holy 
Spirit, he says, is the "Spirit of adoption" (Rom. 8:15). He is, as 
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the Lord himself revealed, the teacher of all the believers in the 
name of the Lord, for as the Lord revealed, He is "the 
Paraclete . . . whom the Father shall send and who shall teach you 
all things" (John 14:16). 
As regards the distribution of the various dignities of 
ministry, it is clearly stated, says Basil, that the Holy Spirit, like 
the Son, is the author of them all to those who are worthy to 
receive them, for "there is a variety of charisms, but the same 
Spirit, a variety of ministries, but the same Lord, various kinds 
jb 
of energies, but the same God who operates all things to all (I 
Cor. 12:4-6). This shows that the energies of the Holy Spirit are 
placed on the same level with the energies of the Father and 
the Son. 
The same applies to the substance of the Spirit, for it 
states ~hat all these things are put to effect by one and the 
same Spirit, dividing them up to each one in particular 
according to his will" (I Cor. 12:11). This statement also shows 
the divine authority and lordship of the Spirit, which is also 
revealed in the solemn statement of Acts 21:11: "thus says the 
Spirit, the Holy One". 
Another energy of the Spirit, which reveals his Godhead 
and excludes the view that he is alien to God, is that he 
"searches the depths of God" (I Cor. 2:10), or that "just as no 
one among human beings knows what things belong to the 
human being, except the spirit of the human being which is 
inside it, likewise no one knows what things belong to God, 
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except the Spirit of God" (I Cor. 2:10-11). 
Finally the Spirit is the giver of life, for as Paul says, "He 
who raised Christ from the dead shall vivify your mortal bodies 
through his Spirit who dwells in you" (Rom. 8:11). 
The inconsistency of Eunomius' Pneumatology 
In A3,5 Basil points out the inconsistency of Eunomius with 
all the above teachings which place the Spirit in the same order 
and dignity with the Father and the Son and demonstrate that 
he is not alien to the Godhead. For Eunomius the Spirit 1) does 
not have a share ( Oj.J.£·toxov) in the Godhead, 2) is third in 
order and substance, 3) was created at the command of the 
Father but through the operation of the Son, 4) is the "first" 
and "greatest" . ~t all the other creatures, because he is 
honoured with the occupation of the third place, 5) is not 
endowed with God's character, _]:lot with his creative power. 
In his response Basil argues that Eunomius seems never to 
have believed that the Godhead "dwells in us" (I Cor. 3:16), m 
spite of John's statement, that "it is from this that we know that 
he is inside us, from the Spirit whom he gave us" (I John 3:24}, 
and Paul's question, "Do you not know that you are the temple 
of God and that the Holy Spirit dwells in you?" (I Cor. 3:16). 
It is an apparent heresy, says Basil, to hold that "the . Spirit has 
no share in the Godhead", when Holy Scripture itself says, that 
God "dwells in us" through the Holy Spirit (Rom. 8:11, II Tim. 
1:11 ). How can it be, he asks, that he who perfects others is 
himself deprived of the Godhead? It is a great impiety to claim 
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that the Spirit has been "honoured" with divinity "by 
participation" {K1:x-ta IJ.£ee:;;w) in the same way as human beings 
have, and not rather that the Godhead co-exists by nature with 
him. When one is deified by grace, one is understood to retain 
the possibility of falling away from this benefit. This, however, 
could not be applied to the Spirit, because in the tradition of 
the saving Baptism the grace of deification is granted "in the 
name of the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit". The gift 
of deification is completed by the divine Trinity and not by the 
Father and the Son and a created Spirit. 
That the Spirit is neither Father nor Son but Spirit 
In A3,6 Basil discusses Eunomius' contention that "the Spirit 
must be a creature and a thing made, since he is neither 
ingenerate, nor generate". He finds the first problem with this 
way of arguing in its rationalism and explains that most things in 
life cannot be explained in rigid rationalistic terms. Neither the 
impressions of our eyes, nor the concepts that are formed in 
our mind are sufficient for explaining things away. Thus we 
normally confess ignorance about the majority of things which 
we encounter. For example no one can tell with accuracy if one 
begets or creates our soul. The same applies to the Holy Spirit, 
of whom we are ignorant, but whom we glorify, in accordance 
with the witness which has been given to us concerning him. It 
is from the Scriptures that we gather the superiority of the 
Spirit over the creatures, since he who sanctifies, teaches, 
reveals, must be greater than those who are sanctified, taught 
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and receive revelation from him. It is absurd to argue that the 
Holy Spirit is not ingenerate as God, <?r On!y-begotten as a Son, 
when it is clearly revealed that he is the "Holy Spirit" (John 
14:26), or "Spirit of God" (I Cor. 1:11,14), or "Spirit of truth" 
(John 14:17), or "the Paraclete, the Holy Spirit who is sent by 
the Father in the name of the Son (John 14:26), or "the 
Paraclete who is sent by the Son from the Father and proceeds 
from the Father" (John 15:26), who is not "servile" but "holy" 
(John 14:26), "good" (Ps. 142:10), "hegemonic" (Ps. 50:14), 
"life-giving Spirit" (John 6:13), "Spirit of adoption" (Rom. 8:15), 
"Spirit who knows all the things of God" (I Cor. 2:10). Basil 
insists that on this evidence the Spirit is accepted for what it is 
and that the unity of Godhead is preserved in the Trinity of the 
Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit. 
The alleged biblical foundations of Eunomius' Pneumatology 
Finally in A3, 7 Basil offers a critical discussion of the 
biblical grounds of Eunomius for claiming that the Spirit is a 
creature, namely the exegesis of Amos 4:13 (" ... who creates 
spirit") and John 1:3 (" ... through whom all things were made"). 
Following Athanasius' exegesis of the same verse in his First 
Letter to Serapion Basil argues that the verse from Amos has 
nothing to do with the Holy Spirit. The word "spirit" used in it 
may have two possible meanings. In fact it can mean a) "breath" 
or "wind", in which case it is well coordinated with the 
preceding word "thunder", and refers to the natural phenomena 
which are created by God for the edification of humanity, and 
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b) it can have a metaphorical5 prophetic meamng related to the 
appearance of Christ who is subsequently mentioned in this 
verse and who is revealed through the natural phenomena of 
thunder (John 12:28,29) and "wind" (Matth. 14:32, Mk 4:39, 
6:51). 
As for the verse John 1:3, Basil explains that the Holy 
Spirit is not included in the phrase "all things", for he is 
acknowledged to be holy and unique, i.e. to belong to the 
unique nature. He also affirms that to reject the view that the 
Spirit is a creature is not to reject that he has a distinctive 
subsistence ( \m601;aou;), and concludes that the pious mind does 
not go beyond what is revealed in Scripture about the Spirit, 
but waits for the new age when one shall be freed from seeing 
the truth through a ~~r and in a riddle and shall see him face 
to face. 
In this Oration also, as in the two preceding ones, Basil 
argues against Eunomius' Arianism in a very similar way to that 
of Athanasius. He primarily employs the teaching of Holy 
Scripture but he does also acknowledge the priority of certain 
philosophical precepts, or common se· .nse, which he uses to 
'--\.7-
e:xpose Eunomius' 'rationalist' arguments. Basil's contribution 
consists in the brevity of his arguments and in the clarity of his 
terminology. 
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PART IV 
THE MAIN THFSES OF ST BASIL'S TRINITARIAN 
THEOLOGY AS CONTRASTED TO THOSE OF EUNOMIUS 
In the previous part of this thesis we attempted to analyse 
the contents of the three Orations of St Basil's Anatreptikos. We 
shall now try to present these contents in a synthetic, systematic 
way. We shall do this by stating and contrasting alternatively the 
Eunomian and Basilian points of view. 
(1) The ingenerate ( cX}'fVVTI'tov) in relation to the Father and 
the Son 
Triadology is the first major point that Basil discusses in his 
first Oration. He actually presents Eunomius' view and offers his 
critical response to it. Eunomius' Triadology is stated in his 
so-called traditional Confession and in two statements concerning 
the substances of the Father and the Son. All these are <;ited by 
St Basil in the beginning of his first Oration: 
1) "We believe in One God, the Almighty Father, and in 
one Only-begotten Son of God, our Lord Jesus Christ, and 
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in one Holy Spirit, the Paraclete"; 
2) "We believe that ingenerateness {ayEvvnoia) is the 
substance of the God of all"; and 
3) "We believe that the Only-begotten is dissimilar 
{av61lotov) to the Father with regard to substance".{l) 
Basil argues that on the basis of these statements only the 
Father is true God, while the Son is differentiated from him as 
his creature. The position of the Holy Spirit is similar to that of 
the Son, with the only difference that the Spirit is not created 
by the Father, but by the Son, and as such he is a creature of 
a creature. 
Two further points should be noted here; firstly that 
Eunomius identifies God's substance with "ingenerateness" and, 
consequently, argues that the "ingenerate" is not a mere concept 
( tni vot a) and, secondly, that he makes a radical differentiation 
of the Son from the Father with respect to substance and 
considers this to be analogous with the radical differentiation of 
the names of the Father and the Son.{2) 
In his response to this Eunomian doctrine St Basil 
concentrates on the concept of "ingenerateness", arguing that it 
is external to God and it should in no way be identified with 
God's substance.(3) Indeed it is a human conception of God, 
similar to many others, such as, God's "beginninglessness", 
"providence", "creative power", etc., all of which refer to God's 
characteristics {iBt4u:x-ca, iBt6-cnu<:) or energies (£v£py£tat) 
which are distinguished from his substance. Thus he argues that 
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if the "ingenerate" were to be identified with God's substance, 
then all the characteristics or energies of God would have to be 
regarded as his substance. The fact is, however, that this is 
quite impossible, inasmuch as the particular conception of the 
"ingenerate" is inconceivable not only as a positive notion 
conceived by the mind {Ka't' £nivotav) but also as a privative 
notion ( Ka'ta o'ttpnot v ). ( 4) Basil can only admit that God's 
substance is "ingenerate", but not, that the "ingenerate" is God's 
substance, the reason being that he distinguishes clearly between 
substance and attribute. A substance is characterized by an 
attribute but is not identified by it. At best ingenerateness is a 
positive conception, and at worst, it is a privative conception. In 
neither case, however, could it be identified with God's 
substance. 
As regards Eunomius' radical claims about the names of 
"Father" and "Son", Basil argues that they do not denote 
substances, but peculiar idioms or peculiar properties ( ouxt 
o\>oiav ncxpio'tnot 'tCx 6v6~cx'ta, 6AA<x 'tQV iBt~'tQV eiot 
B11AQ'tt Ka), and should, therefore, be understood in a similar way 
as the names Peter and Paul, which denote two peculiar 
existences sharing the same substance. 
This discussion leads to the second major point of 
contention between Basil and Eunomius, the use of concepts in 
theology. 
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(2) The use of "concepts" (£1ttvotat) and names (ov~a) in 
theology. 
According to Eunomius there are two types of terms, which 
denote __objects of knowledge: "concepts" ( £1ti vot at) and 
"names" ( ov61J.(X'ta). Actually concepts are fictitious names, devoid 
of objective value and do not lead to the knowledge of an 
object per se. For Eunomius a "concept" does not mean anything 
specific, for it exists only at the moment when it is pronounced 
and that is why it cannot be explained.(5) As regards "names", 
they are cognitive revelations, which express the substance of 
objective realities. God has such an objective name, which is 
identified with the term "ingenerate" ( <lytvvn'toc;) and the notion 
of "ingenerateness" (ayE vvnoi a). 
In his response to this contention Basil explains that the 
term "concept" ( £1ti vot a) means 1) the finer and more exact 
reconstruction in the memory of what had been previously 
grasped by the mind, i.e. a primary thought of something that 
was understood, and 2) a secondary thought, emerging in the 
mind as a result of the formation of a primary thought and 
explaining further what was initially understood. It is in this 
sense that Jesus uses concepts ( £m voi ac:), when he talks about 
himself such as "door", "way", "bread", "vine", "shepherd", 
"light", without suggesting that he has many names, since each 
one of these names has a different meaning, representing a 
particular concept ( £1ti vot a) and constituting a particular idiom 
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or characteristic. Thus, the term "ingenerate" ( ((ytvvmoc;), like 
the term "incorruptible" ( rop8ap'toc;), represents a concept, and at 
( l 
the same time, constitutes a confession of an idiom which truly 
belongs to God.(6) As a negative concept, however, the 
"ingenerate" does not have a particular meaning and is, 
therefore, inadequate for glorifying God. Basil explains that the 
same applies to the terms "incomposite" ( CtiJ.£p£c;) and 
"simple" ( Cx1tAouv ), which cannot be radically distinguished, as 
Eunomius contends. (7) Basil believes that these terms represent 
the same concept, inasmuch as the former denotes that which 
has no parts and the latter, that which is not constituted by 
different parts.(8) 
(3) The knowledge of God 
and the distinction between substance and energies. 
The above discussion leads Basil to expose a fundamental 
theological premise of Eunomius and to replace it by one of his 
own which became a distinctive feature of orthodox theology. 
Eunomius made no distinction between God's cidiorni and his 
substance. As a result of this he claimed that we can know the 
divine substance as completely as God himself knows it.(9) He 
actually claims that he himself conceived of the divine substance 
in his own mind.(lO) Basil considers this claim to be false 
because God's substance is totally inaccessible, to the extent that 
every attempt on the part of man to speak about God's 
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substance by means of rational deductions or arguments is but a 
sort of childish game. This does not mean, however, that God 
cannot be cognitively reached by man. Man is led to his Creator 
through the divine energies which reach down to creaturely 
beings and are specified as God's idioms or attributes. Thus for 
Basil the knowledge of God's idioms does not imply the 
knowledge of his substance. God's idioms, referring to God's 
energies, are clearly distinguished from God's substance, 
inasmuch as they qualify, or characterize it, but never define 
it. (11) Indeed for Basil even the unknowability and 
unapproachability of God's substance is realized through the 
divine energies. Basil was to make this point one of the most 
distinctive theses of orthodox doctrine. As he would put it later 
on in one of his Epistles to Amphilochius, "We claim to know 
God through bis energies, and never promise to approach 
anywhere near God's substance; for God's substance remains 
unapproachable, whereas his energies descend upon us".(12) The 
same was to be stressed in several places in his other great 
systematic theological work, the famous treatise On the Holy 
Spirit. (13) 
Basil's doctrine of the distinction of the divine energies 
from the divine substance(14) is crucial for later theological 
doctrine in Christian Byzantium, especially for hesychastic 
doctrine, which was chiefly expounded by the great saint and 
theologian Gregory Palamas. Palamas clarified this point most 
eloquently by saying that God's existence is not identical with 
I 
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his substance, "for he 'who is' is not from a substance; rather, 
substance is from him who is; and indeed he 'who is' has 
encompassed in himself the entire being".(15) This means, in 
turn, that God can come into communication with human beings 
as the one who is, while remaining unparticipated and 
unapproachable for them as substance.(16) Similar points are 
made by Basil's brother, Gregory of Nyssa, against 
Eunomius,(17) and by Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite.(18) It is 
true that the distinction between the uncreated substance of God 
and his uncreated energies 1~as not fully developed by the early 
fathers. It was mainly used by them to safeguard the simplicity 
of the human nature and to secure the real communion of God 
with his creatures without detriment to the transcendence of the 
divine nature. In Basil's, and generally in patristic teaching, 
knowledge of God by human beings is achieved through God's 
grace, which has to do with God's energies which are issued out 
of God's substance, but are not identical with it. Participation in 
God's energies is the way of deification, which includes the 
knowledge of God. 
( 4) Communicability or incommunicability of God's substance 
To secure the ontological distinction between the true God, 
the Father, and his created God, the Son, Eunomius argues not 
only about the ingenerate as the substance of the former, but 
also about the incommunicability of this substance to the latter 
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(Or.1:19ff). By claiming this to be the case he rejects the notion 
of one divine substance which is common to the Father and to 
the Son. The first reason he adduces for this is the thesis that 
God is beyond all composition or synthesis, which, in turn, 
means that there is no form, volume, or quantity in God's 
substance. Thus he argues that the notion of a common 
substance for the Father and the Son would necessarily imply 
the composition of two substances, one ingenerate and another 
generate, since the Son's substance is identical with his 
generateness just as the Father is identical with his 
ingenerateness. It would also imply the Son's equality to the 
Father, which is contradicted by John 14:28 ("The Father is 
greater than 1"), and the Son's likeness to the Father, which 1s 
contradicted by the fact that God is without quantity ( cmoooc;) 
and without form ( O:vd 8e:oc;), for likeness is an external notion 
and refers to form and volume. 
Eunomius further argues that the Son is an image of the 
Father's counsel and not an image of the Father's substance, 
because he was created by the Father's will. Thus, on the basis 
of the above premises, Eunomius holds that the Son cannot be 
equal to the Father. If the Father is "greater" (IJ.EiCcuv) than the 
Son, as the Son himself says, then the Father has superiority 
over the Son in the sense that he has superior power, superior 
office, superior quantity, as a cause is superior to an effect. 
Consequently the one and only God of all is not only ingenerate 
but incomparable to all else. 
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In view of the above the Son falls short of the glory of the 
Father, being unequal to him as a creature "who was born, not 
as already existing, but as non-existing"!(19) Although he is 
superior to all the creatures, he is not equal with God, because 
his substance was created directly by the Father's will before all 
other creatures were created indirectly through him.(20) 
Inasmuch as the Son followed after the Father, the Father's 
substance is incompatible not only with generateness, but also 
with any other preexisting s ubstance from which the Son was 
'-' 
allegedly born, since the Son did not exist before he was born. 
As regards the Son's superiority over the rest of the 
creatures, Eunomius argues that the substance of the 
Only-begotten is incompatible with any identification with the 
substance of the rest of the things which came into being out of 
non-existence, because "meontic" existence ('to IJ.il ov) is not a 
substance ( ouoio:). On the contrary such superiority ought to 
te 
A attributed to him as needed by a Creator in contrast to his 
creation. It is on the basis of this consideration, says Eunomius, 
that one should understand the Son as Only-begotten (Movoye:vn<: 
= of a unique gender), since he was revealed as tuniquely 
perfect "administrator" ( \moupy6<:) of God in the work of 
Creation, having alone been born and created by the Father 
alone, through the power of the ingenerate. (21) This means that 
there is no likeness between the generation of the Son from the 
Father and the generation of human beings, for God is not 
subject to terms and passions of participation. (22) 
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In line with the above way of thinking and using the image 
of light Eunomius clarifies further the incompatibility of the 
ingenerate substance of the Father in relation to the generate 
substance of the Son. This incompatibility, he says, is similar to 
the one which applied to the ingenerate light in relation to the 
generate light, which is total and absolute.(23) The reason for 
this lies in the fact , that God's kingdom does not admit of 
generateness, whereas that of the Son does, according to the law 
of its generate nature.(24) Thus, Eunomius contends, that those 
who dare to compare the "unruled" ( 0:8£ono•ov) substance, 
which lies above every cause and is free from any law, with the 
substance which is generate and subject to the laws of the 
Father, either have never considered the substance of 
creatures, or do not pass judgment concerning these substances 
with a clear mind".(25) Similarly, "anyone who investigates the 
data which creatures supply and attempts to rise from them to 
the highest substances, not only will he ascertain that the Son is 
a creation of the Ingenerate being and the Paraclete of the 
Only-begotten being, but also will find confirmation of the 
distinction and superiority of the Son's energy over that of the 
creatures and ultimately of the difference of the Son's substance 
from that of the rest of the creation.(26) 
Basil's response to these arguments can be summarized as 
follows: 
1. Basil agrees with Eunomius' thesis that God is beyond all 
composition and synthesis, except that this applies both to the 
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Father and to the Son. This is because the Son is not a creature 
and not unlike (av61-1otoc;) but like (o1-1otoc;) the Father. Thus as 
the Father is simple and incomposite in his substance, so is the 
Son who is incorporeal, w: ithout form and shape in his 
c--~ 
substance. It is clear that the crucial point in Basil's response 
has to do with his distinction of 1idioms' from substance. This 
distinction enables him to hold that ingenerateness and 
generateness are not substances, but 'idioms' and, as such, they 
are distinguished from God's substance and are in no way able 
to divide it. 
2. As regards Eunomius' fsyllogism) that the Father is 
"greater" than the Son, Basil explains that the term "greater" 
does not denote superiority but cause or beginning. It denotes 
the cause of the Son since the Son is derived from the Father. 
In the same way Basil rejects the other syllogism of Eunomius 
which posits the incomparability of the Father to the Son. Here 
Basil charges Eunomius with inconsistency, not only because he 
is alien to the Peace of God, but he is also a blasphemer, 
Q.S 
inasmuch~ his contention stands in /direct contradiction to the 
statement of John 10:30, "I and the Father are one", which 
reveals the Son's substance as undifferentiated from that of the 
Father. 
3. As regards Eunomius' claim that the Son's substance is 
superior to that of the rest of the creatures, Basil points out 
that it makes no sense and, indeed, is useless, because by 
disallowing the subjection of the Son's substance to the category 
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of time, it makes it pre-existent of time and therefore eternally 
existing. He has always _ b~~ __ _in existence inasmuch as the 
Father has always existed.(27) For Basil the Father is Father of 
one Son and therefore the Father has no beginning. The Son, 
however, has the Father as his beginning. Yet there is nothing 
that interferes between them, and so the Father IS not 
temporally superior but is honoured first as being cause of the 
Son. This means that the communion of Father and Son is 
eternal. Indeed eternal means nothing else than existing prior to 
all time and age. That the Son is eternal in this sense is clearly 
attested to in the Scriptures which teach that "all things carne to 
be through him", including time and ages.(28) 
As regards Eunornius' claim that the Son is more ancient 
than creation, Basil qualifies it as a sophistry, because it 
presupposes an understanding of the Son's generation which is 
anthropomorphic or literally anthropopathic. (29) Furthermore this 
claim stands in direct opposition to the Gospel statement John 
1:1, "In the beginning was the Logos and the Logos was with 
God... and the Logos was God," since "nothing can be prior to 
the beginning".(30) The word "was" (nv), says Basil, does not 
imply that he existed since a certain point of time, but that his 
existence is extended as much as that beginning which is 
unsurpassable. For Basil the "was" ('to nv) is like the "who is" 
('to f.lv ), denoting, that is, who is eternal and timeless. Thus in 
these few words one has to include the Son's eternal existence, 
the Son's impassible birth from the Father, the Son's 
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co-existence with the Father, the Son's magnift_s:ent nature and 
everything that concerns his Godhead. By this little word "was" 
not only is the Son raised to the "beginning", but also has his 
birth united with the eternity of the Father. This means that the 
Son has always existed along'fith the Father. 
4. Basil also qualifies as sophistry Eunomius' understanding 
of the Son as Only-begotten which rests on the Son's 
functioning as God's perfect "administrator" in creation. Indeed it 
is a blasphemy to place the Son among the "administrative 
spirits" {t..Et •oupyt Ka nvE\Ji.J.o:•o:) which came into being out of 
non-existence. The Son, says Basil, who is revealed to Moses in 
the burning bush as "the One Who Is" (Ex. 3:14) cannot be 
characterized as God's administrator. Although he is called by 
the prophet, "an Angel of great counsel", he is also called "a 
Mighty God, a Leader of peace, a Father of the future age" {Is. 
9:6). These statements clearly expose as blasphemy every 
attempt to characterise the Son as a creature, even a unique one 
or Only-begotten one. If the term Only-begotten was applicable 
to the Son as creature, then the Son could not exhibit to us the 
being of the Father, but if he is a true offspring as he is then 
he is "the character of the Father's subsistence" (according to 
Hebr. 1:3). 
As regards Eunomius' statements concerning the ingenerate 
and generate Lights, Basil argues that there is no difference 
between them since the word light implies a concrete identity 
both as a gift or a concept. We cannot differentiate light from 
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light. The only legitimate differentiation is that of light from 
darkness. Thus the differentiation of ingenerate from generate 
does not correspond to a differentiation of light from light. The 
Fact is that the Son as Light has CO\.tllt, forth from the Father 
as Light, and since the latter is eternal, the former must be 
eternal too; similarly if the latter is known as life, the former 
must be known as life too. This is in fact the teaching of the 
Evangelist John, who speaks of the Son as "the true Light" 
(John 1:19) and of the Lord himself, who says in the Gospel, "I 
am the life" (John 16:6). 
(5) Distinguishing o\Ja{a from \rn601:aotc;, qnxnc; from i8t61:11c; 
Being a faithful follower of Arius, Eunomius made ample 
use of Aristotelian philosophy. Thus he argued that, "It is 
impossible to understand [the Son's] substance to be one thing 
and the name which designates it to be another. Rather, [his] 
substance is his hypostasis which is designated by his name (Son] 
and so his designation is proved to be true by his 
substance".(31) This argument is based on the following, "When 
we say Ingenerate we do not think that we must honour [God] 
only in name according to human conceptual invention; rather 
we ought to repay to him, in accordance with the truth, our 
most necessary duty, namely the confession of what he is".(32) 
All the above clearly indicates that Eunomius identified idiom 
( i&t6'tnc;) and hypostasis with substance (or nature) in God. 
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God's name as ingenerate, i.e. ingenerateness 1s nothing else but 
I 
the substance of the Father, his nature. When therefore one 
speaks about God's ingenerateness one understands by it the 
species of the nature of the Father and not a characteristic 
idiom of his substance. Similarly the designation of the Son as 
generate or offspring is nothing else but his substance, his 
nature. Thus generateness is the species of his nature. 
On the basis of this understanding Eunomius concluded that, 
since the ingenerate is different from the generate and since the 
former denotes the substance of the Father and the latter the 
substance of the Son, it is clear that the natures of the Father 
and the Son must be different. Consequently the Son cannot be 
eternal as the Father, nor homoousios with the Father. It was 
probably the 'logical' basis of this thinking, combined with the 
spiritual restlessness of the people of that time that attracted 
many people in the fourth century to the Eunomian position. 
This would have carried the day, had it not been for Basil who 
fought against it in a decisive way as he exposed the inadequacy 
of metaphysics for understanding revealed theology.(33) 
Basil's main weapon here was the distinction between the 
divine substance and the various names attributive to the three 
divine persons. Thus he argued that ingenerateness and 
generateness are some K'it~~:toJ cogniti~e prqpertie§ _(yvc.ilptonKcd 
r--~ 
' 
't t vt<; i St 6'tll'tE<;), (34) designating manner of existence and not 
the nature of the subject (of the Father and of the Son). They 
denote, as he says, either the reference of one subject to 
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another, or the properties of a given subject. "For this is the 
nature of the properties, to show where the difference is in the 
identity of the substance; and it often happens that these 
properties are radically diffitorentiated from each other and even 
contrasted as opposites, without, however, dividing the unity of 
the substance".(35) Therefore, the words ingenerate and generate 
denote the peculiar properties of two different persons who 
share the same nature, rather than God's substance. They are 
energies of God, like the designations beginningless, creator, 
unchangeable, all-mighty, etc. The terms ingenerate and generate 
'iJ--L 
are in no way the substance of God, but A peculiar property of 
God, since the nature of the Father and the Son is denoted by 
the term Godhead. This is why Basil divides the properties into 
properties which properly belong to God and properties which 
do not belong to him. He makes this distinction because he 
wants to prove that the ingenerate is included among the 
properties which do not belong to God, since the generate does 
not belong to him either.(36) 
Basil's distinction between the substance and the properties 
opens the way for his other distinction between substance and 
hypostasis, the former being applicable to the unity and the 
latter to the Trinity. This appears very clearly in his second 
Oration where he states that "the different designations of 
particular human beings [like Peter and Paul] do not divide the 
human substance which remains one... and hence these 
designations do not denote substances but peculiar properties ( cxi 
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npoonyopiat OUXt •&v OUOt&V EiOt on~av•tKat, ~ •&v 
i8to•n•<..>v, at •ov Ka9' EVa xapaK•npi(ouot •.. QV ou8£v £o•t v 
ouoia, l)c; n \m6o•aotc; vooUj..L£vn)... which imply the 
hypostases. (37) 
Basil's theological distinction between substance and 
hypostasis led him to propound the formula "one substance, 
three hypostaseis". By "substance" Basil means the general sense 
of every existence; the common element in all individual 
existences, which belong to the same genus. To say, then, that 
in God the substance is one means that the definition of its 
existence is not differentiated. By contrast the term "hypostasis" 
specifies individual or particular existence. "Hypostasis" is the 
particular being which includes the substance; that which is 
individual, peculiar, or particular existence. It is the relation 
between the the general and the particular, and, as such, it does 
not come into any antithesis with what is common; nor does 
what is common extinguish what is peculiar. This can be 
perfectly illustrated by reference to the human being. All human 
beings participate as human in the nature of the human being, 
but, at the same time, they exist through their peculiar 
characteristics as particular persons, e.g., Athanasius, Demetrios, 
Maria, etc. Likewise in the Holy Trinity the three persons of 
the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit participate in the their 
common nature, in holiness, goodness, godhood, etc., but, at the 
same time, retain respectively the peculiarities of fatherhood, 
sonship and sanctifying power. 
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Basil employed the term "common" ( Kot v6v) as equivalent 
to substance and "peculiar" (Hhov or i8t&.Co::) as equivalent to 
hypostasis so that he can distinguish the unity A.:~he Godhead from 
the Trinity of the persons, in his De Spiritu Sancto which he 
wrote in 374/5. 
Substance and hypostasis differ between them as the 
common differs from the particular, or as the human being 
differs from the particular human being. Thus in the case of the 
Godhead only one substance is accepted, so the the logic of 
existence may not be attributed differentially, as Basil explains 
in his Epistle 236 ( ch. 6). At the same time peculiar hypostaseis 
are accepted so that the meaning of Father, Son and Holy Spirit 
may be employed without confusion, but lucidity. 
To avoid the usual confusion of these terms, Basil calls the 
three hypostaseis homoousios and applies this understanding 
liturgically through the formula: Glory to the Father, with the 
Son together with the Holy Spirit. The one glorification of the 
Trinity in this formula is based on the identity of the divine 
nature. 
( 6) The Doctrine of the Spirit 
Both Eunomius and Basil exten~ their arguments concerning 
the Son's relation to God to the Spirit as well. 
Eunomius argues that the order and dignity of the Spirit 
indicate his ontological status as a third kind of being. Indeed 
not only is he third in relation to the Father and the Son but 
he is a creature, created by the Son as the first of his creations. 
111 
Basil's first response is to distinguish between order and nature 
or dignity and nature. He does, however, go on to construct his 
defence of the true Godhead of the Spirit by focusing, like 
Athanasius before him, on the work of the Spirit as this is 
revealed in the Scriptures. Here he emphasizes the powers of 
adoption, revelation, vivification, divine indwelling and 
s*tification of the Holy Spirit and the fact that his holiness is 
his natural property and not a. property acquired by participation 
as it is the case with creatures. Indeed creatures are sanctif 
by partaking of the Holy Spirit, who never partakes of anyone 
in order to be holy. 
Furthermore Basil reinforces his anti-Eunomian pneumato-
. 
logical views by exan¥g the divine names which specify the 
Spirit in the Scriptures and which indicate his Godhead because 
they are equally used to specify the Father and the Son as well. 
He also argues against the two 'biblical' arguments of Eunomius 
based on Am. 4:13 and Jn 1:13 following the same herme~tical 
tradition as Athanasius who had argued similarly against the 
Egyptian Tropici. 
Finally,. as regards the Spirit's peculiar 1dion?J Basil prefers to 
acknowledge pious ignorance, although he does point to the 
relevant Johannine and Pauline teaching in order to establish the 
mystery of his divine identity. 
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EPILOGUE 
In many ways the general viewpoint of St Basil's theological 
doctrine against Eunomius in not very different from that of St 
Athanasius against Arius. He too defends the unity and the 
Trinity of God insisting that the one is not undermined by the 
other. 
What is different in St Basil is the way in which he 
systematizes and expresses this doctrine in a more lucid and 
succinct way. This is probably due to the fact that, unlike St 
Athanasius who avoided discussion of philosophical points, St 
Basil did not shrink from using philosophy in order to expose 
both the philosophical inconsistencies of his opponents and the 
limits of philosophy when confronted with the mystery of God. 
This is especially seen in his discussion of Eunomius' 
distinction of two kinds of names which correspond to two kinds 
of conceptions, i.e. conceptions which define the ontology of a 
given reality (even of God} and conceptions which arise only in 
the mind and constitute empty inventions. Basil's rejection of 
this distinction and his clarification of the relation of concepts to 
reality enabled him to restate the Nicene Athanasian theology of 
God's unity and Trinity in 'new terms' which opened the way 
for the classical formulation of Christian Triadology. 
Basil's Nicene orthodoxy, like that of Athanasius, is based 
on Scripture and the experience of the faith in the Church, but 
his way of formulating it not only refutes the error of 
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Anomoian Arianism but also reconciles the Homoioousian 
position to that of the orthodox Homoousians. St Athanasius 
had attempted this in his De Synodis, but it is Basil who 
finalizes the Athanasian legacy. 
Particularly significant in this connection is his use of the 
term idioms and his distinction between two kinds of idioms, 
those which are common and characterize nature in general and 
those which are peculiar and characterize particular beings. 
Athanasius had used the related terms idion and idios to describe 
the same distinction but had never presented it as sharply 
and clearly as Basil does in these Orations. Indeed such a 
distinction is only reached by inference. Basil, however, not only 
states this distinction in quite unambiguous terms, but also 
clarifies its content by linking it on the one hand to the 
distinction between the divine substance and the divine activity 
or energy and on the other hand, to the distinction between the 
one divine substance and the three hypostaseis of the Trinity. 
Admittedly this last distinction emerges in a very preliminary 
way. But it is here stated clearly for the first time and it is 
going to become later on the most important contribution of St 
Basil's and of the Cappadocian s") 'new' Nicene orthodoxy. 
Basil's method is biblical and ecclesiastical like that of 
Athanasius. His distinctive contribution lies in the employment of 
new terms which clarify and establish the theological viewpoints 
of Nicene orthodoxy. 
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